Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/451

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PRAGMATISM. 437 losophy. The business of philosophy is to explain reality or to discover the truth about the world, and of course the discovery of truth or of the highest reality includes a meth- odology, a theory of the nature of fruitful and unfruitful hypotheses. But Prof. James's Pragmatism is, when we look into it, very much more than the mere practical methodology that it seems to be. It reposes in the last resort on a theory of reality to which, judging from many appearances in contemporary scientific thought, philosophy must more and more have recourse as a basis for con- struction and system. Let us however outline somewhat definitely and precisely our author's standpoint. I. This, he declares, is an adoption and development of principles laid down, some twenty years ago, by a Mr. Charles S. Peirce, " one of the most original of contemporary thinkers," in an article in the Popular Science Monthly, entitled "Illustrations of the Logic of Science". "To develop a thought's meaning," we are told, " we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce ; that conduct is for us its sole [!] significance." Or, " to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all." And again : " The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires ". Or, more pointedly : " The effective meaning [what a charac- teristically American idea this is ! ] of any philosophic pro- position can always be brought down [sic !] to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive ; the point lying rather in the fact that the, experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active ". After these statements about the nature and essence of Pragmatism, Prof. James proceeds to illustrate its utility as a principle of philosophy by reference to some of its con- sequences and applications. (1) One of these is that " to be mindful of it in philosophical discussions tends wonder- fully to smooth out misunderstandings and to bring in peace". Cela va sans dire, although the truth of a philo- sophy is not proved by showing its value as an eirenikon. (2) Another is that two philosophical definitions or proposi- tions or maxims whose practical consequences to all people at all time, are identical. This too is but a formal truth or