PHILOSOPHICAL I'KlUolHCALS. .YY.I experience.".] W. Fite. ' Tin- Assoeiational Conception of Kxp.-rionoe. 1 | Associationisin is now opposed to apperceptionism, thu antith. come about by tin- introduction into psychology of tl mc,.,,t ,,t tion. The apperception theory declares that knowledge begins will, a tendency to view the world as a harmonii. .. : m.| tint it is the operation of this ^tendency which brings out the differen sensation elements ' ". To meet the facts, the associations! mint his theory in terms of physiology, anil must sul. mull for sensations in his notion of 'experience'.] A. K. Rogros. The Hegelian Conception of Thought ir. .' [" No object is ultimately c<> able except as it forms an element in a conscious e we know as the external world of related objects is. in its final truth, such an objectively constituted experience, of which we get the ty|x- in cmr own lives; . . . the categories which we apply to object.* arc <ml understood . . . by reference to this interpretation of what the nature and activities of things really consist in." This leaves behind tin- peculiar claims of Hegelianism as a method. As for the Absolut the time-process, "time, in so far as it presents antinomies, is a |> of thought, and as such has no place in the absolute life, which finds no need for thinking in the ordinary sense".] Reviews of Hooks. Sum- maries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. vii.. No. '2. J. Dawoy I' and Social Practice.' [There are certain psychological presuppo- controlling educational theory and practice: (1) the assumption of identity of mental attitude in child and adult, which overlooks the growth of specialised habits and aims in the man, and the paramoiintcv of questions of growth in the child; ('2) the assumption of difiV: where there is really identity, i.e., in the motives which govern attention. These must be set aside. As for mechanism r. personality, life functions must be stated in terms of objective mechanism if we are ertieientK to direct them. So in general: a reflective (as distinct from a customary) morality implies an attempt to get the method or mechanism by which the end is readied ; it and the demand for psychological statement were born and have grown together.] ' Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Yale Univ> December, 1899.' O. S. Fuller-ton. ' The Criterion of Sensation.' [The criterion offered by psychology is ultimate only for convenience of dis- cussion within a particular field of work. The contradiction between the doctrine of representative perception and the assumption that we directly perceive a real world, final for psychology, is not tit epistemology, to which the psychologists may refer it for resolution.] Discussion and Reports. A. H. Lloyd. ' Physical Psychology. [" Physical psychology is concerned with the substitutes or indiro' for mind that appear in all the 'physical' sciences, in chemistry, physics and mathematics." (1) Opposites must individually reproduce their opposition, so that there are forced into these sciences certain al> tions or disguises for mind ; (2) conservation and infinity and plenitude and motion bear witness to the presence of intension, of the unity ami indivisibility of mind, in the physical world.] Psychological Literature. New Books'. Notes. Vol. vii., No. 3. C.L.Morgan. On tin: delation of Stimulus to Sensation in Visual Impressions.' [Deals especially with the relation of sensation to stimulus in the cases of white, n-d and blue on a black background. The law indicated is that " equal i of sensation are produced by increments of stimulus in geometrical pro- sion ".] L. M. Solomons. ' A New Kxplanation of Weber's ["The explanation is to be sought neither in the nature of romp
