136 NEW BOOKS. Kanfs Lehre von der Freiheit. Ein Beit rag zur Lbsung des Problems der Willensfreiheit. Von Dr. CARL GERHARD. Heidelberg : G. 1885. Pp. 84. Kant's doctrine of freedom is expounded in Sections i.-iv. ; Section v. is a criticism of the Kantian doctrine ; in Section vi. (pp. 59-84) the author attempts a positive solution of the problem of freedom. He accepts from Kant the position that without free-will there can be no moral responsi- bility ; and he refuses to acknowledge as true freedom the " empty fiction " of a "liberty of indifference". Freedom is the power man has of taking part in the formation of his own character. Human freedom is always relative and limited ; for the direction is already given in many respects to character at birth by innate dispositions ; but only so far as character is the work of freedom is a man responsible for his character. This freedom is quite compatible with the necessity of human actions. Freedom is not the opposite of necessity but of compulsion ; the opposite of necessity is contingency (p. 76). " Particular actions are necessary," being the product of character and motives, "but the will, or rather the person willing, is free". The freedom of the person is manifested in action according to fixed maxims. This view of freedom the author regards as founded on Kant's doctrine, and as substantially identical with the essential part of it. The placing of the free act outside time, and the distinction of the intelli- gible and the empirical character, are indeed rejected. But, as regards tin- first point, it is contended that Kant also recognises the freedom that consists in the power of modifying character in the actual course of life ; and, as regards the second point, the term " character," as used by the author, is really identical with Kant's "intelligible character. For tin- effect of the Kantian doctrine of the " intelligible character " is to attach the idea of freedom to that in man which is internal, instead of to its external or " empirical " manifestations. Das Grundgesetz der Wissensckaft. Von EMAXUEL JAESCHE, Dr. med. Heidelberg : G. Weiss, 1886. Pp. xx., 445. The fundamental law of scientific knowledge, which it is the author's aim to set forth, is the requirement that each group of tilings should be completely determined as a "scientific whole" in relation to the unity of knowledge. The conception of knowledge as a unity, and of the di-ter- mination of things in relation to it as the end of science, is to be kept in view in every kind of special research. This idea, stated in tin- " < Jcneral Part" (pp. 3-36), the author tries to work out in the " Special Part :: of his book (pp. 39-445), under the heads of " The corporeal World," " The ani- mated World," "The conscious World," and "The self-conscious World". Die Grenzen des Glaubens. Von ANTON OLZEI.T-N i:vix. Wit 11 : C. Kone- gi-n. 1885. Pp. 43. An examination of belief in the law of causation, free-will, &<., intruded to show that in each case the only position intellectually justifiable is scepticism. Philosophy will "alwass remain the science of insoluble ([UrMioii.-. and is " more an atl'air of need and of taste, more an art than a kind of knowledge". With philosophy mu>t be das.-ed religion. "In both, agreement in the. most useful belief is po.-sible, not through argu- ments, but, as in politics, when judgments, feelings and need.-, of men have become alike." This agreement is obtained as the result of an authoritative appeal by teachers to the experience of life. Tlie lew who carry their intellectual consdentiousneae so far as to lie ina<ve>sible to such appeals either remain uninfluenced by " those powers that build a world
