W. E. SORLEY, ON THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM. 263 The same criticism in other forms is brought against the utili- tarian doctrine and against "egoistic hedonism". All naturalistic theories alike confound investigations of what is or has been with the determination of what ought to be. A separate chapter (Pt. L, c. 4) is devoted to the " ethics of moral sentiment " of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, which is found to occupy an inse- cure position between the empiricism or naturalism that "denies to reason any spontaneous or creative function " and the opposing theory of rationalism. By no naturalistic or semi-naturalistic theory, the argument runs, are we enabled to pass from the point of view of science to the point of view of morality. Only the doctrine that ascribes spontaneity to Eeason, that sees the reality of things as a system of relations in a universal self- consciousness, and that introduces the notion of end or purpose into its view of the world as a whole, can furnish a valid philo- sophy of ethics. In the part of his book that deals specially with the hedonistic theories (Pt. i., cc. 2, 3), Mr. Sorley puts very well most of the arguments that have been urged against utilitarianism as an ethical doctrine and against its psychological basis. It will be best, however, to pass rapidly over this portion of the work. Hardly any one who accepts the theory of evolution can hold that this theory makes no difference to the position of utilitarian ethics ; and Mr. Sorley himself believes that evolution has come not to fulfil hedonism but to destroy it. His chapters on the theory of evolution, therefore (Pt. ii., cc. 5-8), are those that it is desirable more particularly to examine. Perhaps Mr. Sorley attaches too much importance to the re- jection of hedonism by some evolutionists. Especially in modern times the ascetic bias is a constant cause tending to prevent moralists from being avowedly hedonistic ; and the appearance of a new scientific theory, with important ethical bearings, natu- rally had for one of its earliest consequences stimulation of the research for a non-hedonistic basis of morals. Hence we need not regard this opposition of evolution to hedonism as inherent in the theory itself. Doctrines such as those which make "work " or "efficiency" or "complexity" ends in themselves are partly expressions of the ascetic bias, partly, we may suppose, voluntary illusions intended by their authors as prophylactics against pessimism. But Mr. Sorley, of course, does not confine himself to the argument from the actual developments of evolutionist doctrines in ethics. Standing over against the non-hedonistic theories, there are the more important systems of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Leslie Stephen. Much criticism is devoted to showing the in- adequacy of these attempts to combine hedonism with evolution. Mr. Sorley candidly admits that he is not convinced by the pessimistic arguments ; but he contends that, since an exact pro-
