308 F. H. BEADLEY : instance is the appearance in sensation or perception of an element not striking in itself but with which a dominant idea is associated. If an idea or a mass of ideas are so inte- resting that they are able to engross us, then the elements connected with them, whether sensible or ideal, may engross us also (cp. J. S. Mill, loc. cit.}. Whether perceptions and ideas that attract us by their strangeness belong to this class I shall not enquire, nor for the present shall I ask what "interesting" means. What must engage us is the doubt if in this class we have everywhere active attention. When a thought, as we say, is much in our minds, and we dwell upon everything that suits with its presence and supports its rule, we do not know of any act, since all comes of itself. ' If I am active,' we should ask, ' what is it that I do ? ' and it is better therefore to go on to clearer instances. When I retain an idea or keep watch on an object, and still more when I investigate, I am supposed to act and also to attend, since my thoughts are confined to one main subject. But is this active attention ? When for example at this moment I write about attention, I am active no doubt and I presume attending ; but if you ask me whether I actively attend, I hesitate for an answer. For, if I am well and not distracted, attention seems of itself to wait upon my other activity, and, if it does not come because of it, seems to come spontaneously. It is otherwise where I have resolved to attend to some matter and still persevere. We have here the attention that proclaims itself active, and there is more than one variety. I may simply intend to occupy my mind with a certain sub- ject, or may resolve in particular to be active upon it in such or such a manner. Let us enumerate the results of the above survey. In the first place (1) we may have resolved to attend, or (2) to effect some mental operation which involves attention. We may also (3) perform the same a.ct without intention or resolve, and again, where we are not conscious of action, (4) a domi- nant idea may lend its force to a connected element. Once more, (5) a muscular act, itself the result of idea (and perhaps feeling), may cause the predominance of sensation or idea ; or (6) a sensation may be fixed by a simple reflex ; or (7) lastly some element may predominate by what seems its own superior energy. The two last varieties, I think, must now be dismissed. They have of course great psychological impor- tance, but it seems evident that they are not art in attention. I shall go on to attempt a clearance of the ground by dealing with the claim of muscular action ; for if this con- tained the essence of active attention, our task would be
