314 F. H. BRADLEY : To resume then, ideas of ideas are possible, and such ideas can dominate, and the presence of these ideas can produce their own reality. And so far attention has been fully ex- plained as an instance of the working of ordinary laws. But we have still another class of our facts to consider. The cases of attention which so far we have surveyed are in a sense involuntary. In them we had not a resolve to attend. We must now deal with the class where I say, ' I will attend to this matter,' and do so, or where at all events I resolve to perform such an act as implies attention. At this point, it may be said, our explanation breaks down, and here we have a specific and original activity. All before was automatic, but this is volitional and gives us a direct revelation of energy. But an energy that does what ? is the natural reply. I suppose an energy that fixes and strengthens. Well, if so, I am led to remark at once that the presumption is in favour of our old account, because fixation and strengthening was what it explained. If, when I simply attend, that function results from an indirect interest, is it likely that when I resolve to attend we should have to import a wholly new factor and bring upon the stage a supervening agency ? Let us examine this more nearly. When I readily attend to the details of a subject and perform the operations (both physical and mental) that lead to a view of them, or when in general I pursue the means to some end, that, we saw, did not involve any other attention than was explained by the normal working of interest. We must now take the case where, prompted to such appli- cation, I am solicited elsewhere, and return to my task after wavering and struggle, perhaps in addition saying to myself, ' I am resolved to mind my business '. And there is a sug- gestion, it would seem, that in these cases we are met by a difference of principle. But, we ask, where is this difference ? In the struggle of ideas and feelings in my mind, and in the inconstant result, there is nothing surely which calls for special explanation, nor most assuredly is there a conscious- ness of special activity. And if it is the act of resolve upon which stress is laid, then I fully admit that this function must be recognised as differing from others, but I see no reason to think it one kind by itself or as anything but an instance of our general principles. We have seen that what inter. occupies our minds, and that it does so directly or indirectly. We have seen that in the latter class we have the working of an idea, and in some cases also the help of an action, physi- cal or intellectual such action not being an activity of
