410 CRITICAL NOTICES I tury by Roscellinus the Nominalist. . . . Nominalism distinctly anticipated the Critical Philosophy in referring the source of all general conceptions (and thereby of all human knowledge) not to the object alone or to the object and subject together, but to the subject alone ; it distinctly anticipated' the doctrine that ' things conform to cognition, not cognition to things ' " (p. 3). Thus, through the influence of Kant, "all modern philosophy, by tacit agreement, rests upon the Nominalistic theory of universals " (p. 5). The principle of Association, for example, which rules "the English School " is only " one of the innumerable aliases by which Nominalism eludes detection at the bar of contemporary thought" (p. 5). And "the strength of Idealism" is "the strength of Nominalism no more, no less (p. 7). In thus calling attention to the Nominalistic current in philo- sophical thought, and tracing it from its source to its latest issues, Mr. Abbot has done a real service. The justice of his complaint must also be allowed, that the significance of the Nominalistic principle has not hitherto been appreciated by the historians of philosophy. Farther, his detection of a Nominalistic vein in Kant is just and important. But when he proceeds to reduce Kant's entire work to a mere development of Nominalism, Mr. Abbot is evidently going beyond his record. It may be granted that Kant was himself a Nominalist, and that his Nominalism is the clue to much that he says of the 'object,' the ' thing-in-itself,' &c. But that the Critical Philosophy of which he is the founder is no more than the "logical development of Nominalism," that Kant was "anticipated" by Roscellinus, will not be admitted by anyone who understands Kant. The ' revolution ' to which Kant laid claim was real and thorough-going. It was more than a "revival of Nominalism"; it was something new; and one is forced to infer, both from this general attitude and from several remarks on the subject, that Mr. Abbot has not appreciated its real significance. He confuses Critical or Transcendental with Psychological or Empirical Idealism. This confusion comes out in many passages : e.</., " A consistent Idealist can claim to know no more than this that there exist ideas in his consciousness " (p. 8). "The Idealist begins with his consciousness alone as the only certain or indubitable datum." " Knowledge itself .... is confined to the series of changes that go on in consciousness " (p. 36). Accordingly, he speaks of Transcendentalists, equally with Psychological Idealists, as " phenomenalists ". " The root of modern idealism, whether in its transcendental or experiential form, is the theory of Pheii<>mi>n!>*m the theory that nothing can be known except ' phenomena,' and that all phenomena depend for their existence on individual human consciousness alon< " (p. 71). And in its " advanced form "the theory of phenomenism is said to be "based on the Kantian philosophy". All this betrays a want of appreciation of the peculiarity or itvrrlti/ of the Kantian position. Kant's a priori is identified with the old "
