488 S. H. HODGSON : and that science is analytic philosophy or Metaphysic, or in other words the analysis of that stream of consciousness which contains the data of experience, as set forth in the former part of the present paper. But Mr. Dewey will have it, that psychology and philosophy are identical, that there is no philosophy but psychology, or, in his own words, that psy- chology is philosophic method. This a priori resolution of his, this Mezentian marriage which he is bent on celebrating, compels him to subordinate the experience of philosophy to the presuppositions of psychology, while still professing to appeal to experience, as a genuine disciple of the English School. True, ifc is only his logic that is at fault, but then logic is a large only. If English Psychology in Mr. Dewey's sense, in which, as he tells us, it is substantially identified with German Tran- scendental Philosophy, is to begin with the ideas which Mr. Dewey endeavoured to show in his first article were neces- sarily involved in its necessary presupposition, it is hardly fair in him to his English readers to call it psychology simply. He ought in simple fairness to have named it psychology human and divine. It cannot be " in substantial identity with the presuppositions and results of the ' transcendental ' movement " (p. 154), and be psychology in the usually accepted sense too. No psychologist, I venture to say, in this country considers himself to be busied with the psychology of the Universal Self, or to be trespassing on ground covered by the theological doctrine of the SS. Trinity. German Transcendentalism no doubt embraces all this ground, but English Psychology, unless surrendered to Transcenden- talism, does not. And, as Mr Dewey frankly admits, tran- scendentalism itself entirely repudiates the claim of "psy- chology to be anything more than one of the special sciences (p. 154). In short it rejects the proffered morsel. Supposing however, with Mr. Dewey, that psychology, notwithstanding its substantial identity with transcenden- talism, still retains a definite nature and character of its own, a question occurs which, I suspect, will prove not a little embarrassing. The question is this. If psychology is philo- sophic method, which psychology is the one intended ? Is it physiological psychology, or is it the psychology of an im- material Psyche ? I content myself with naming the two main antagonistic directions taken by psychologists, without specifying the various subdivisions, or combinations of sub- divisions, into which they fall. It is clear that, before psychology can pretend to be the method of philosophy, it must have made up its mind what its own mode of pro-
