40 W. MITCHELL : sphere as such. Every science has both a general and a particular determination. Thus the physical sciences are generally determined under logical laws with reference to their generic element, while they are also particularly dis- tinguished from one another. So in Ethics, though freedom is an indispensable characteristic, and even though it might be said that we should not have become aware of freedom but for morality, it is not freedom which constitutes Ethics as a separate branch of philosophy, seeing that we are as free in other spheres of experience to which morality as such does not extend. Nor is it the possession of self-evident practical laws or of an ideal ; for we possess such in the sphere of prudence which is out of, or at least wider than, the sphere of Ethics. Finally, merit or demerit being the concomitant of freedom is likewise too wide, and responsibility is con- sequent upon obligation. If, then, there is a distinct sphere in the round of human action call it Ethics, as in this paper, or a branch of Ethics, it is no matter it is determined from the rest of human action by moral obligation, which on that account becomes also the first determiner of its contents. When we say that Ethics exists for the enlightenment of our moral obligation, we do not mean that a doctrine of duty must always be the main feature of eveiy system. We should rather expect it to be the least prominent part. But it should always be remembered that what affords the guiding line of the whole process, what enables us to get beyond our own subject to legislate in morals, and what makes society a legislator for us, is this obligation. However slightly therefore anyone treats of Duty, and this is naturally most apparent in Aris- totle the founder of Ethics as a distinctive science, it is this conception which determines every other ethical idea. Our question, then, is What theories of End, Freedom, Merit and Responsibility are consistent with the postulate which enables them to be ethical theories at all, and lor the sake of whose ultimate enlightenment they ought to exist ? The character of any ethical system is known by the end, ideal or standard of action which it professes. Our question is What must be the characteristics of the end by reason of its determination through obligation It is just the converse of this question that is usually put. But every attempt to derive . m^htness from rightness most, we have shown, either end in an illogical system or desi the possibility of a separate science of Ethics at all. The history of Ethics in England furnishes an apt illustration in
