558 H. EASHDALL : appears to admit " that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or, at least, not contrary to it ". I believe that, fairly considered, this passage implies no more than what was admitted in Sermon ii., viz., that there is a primd facie obligation to promote one's own good, though it may be overridden by the superior authority of Conscience enforcing the claims of Benevolence. It should be observed that this sentence is ushered in by a "Let it be allowed". Butler is willing to concede this position as to the claims of " Self-love," and yet he is prepared to prove the obligation to virtue even upon that supposition. His own position is that the obligation to virtue is nearer and more obvious than that of self-love ; Eeason, however, demands that there shall ultimately be an identity between private and public good. But what if there be a collision ? Well, in that case Reason would be divided against itself. Reason will still say ' Promote the public good ' ; yet it will be impossible to show that the conduct of the man who in that case prefers his private good is altogether irrational. Such seems to me to be the meaning of the sentence above quoted when interpreted by the sentence which follows: "Common reason and humanity will have some influence upon mankind, whatever becomes of speculation ; but so far as the interests of virtue depend upon the theory of its being secured from open scorn, so far its very being in the world depends upon its appearing to have no contrariety to private interest and self-love ". How then does Butler make out this harmony between the claims of virtue and those of self-love ? By insisting upon the principle that "disinterestedness" is no anomalous peculiarity of " benevolence " or " public passions," but is common to all " desires of objects," the attainment of which gives pleasure because they have been desired, instead of (as Hobbes had maintained) being desired as so many means to the attainment of a maximum pleasure. It is, therefore, Butler maintained, quite as likely a priori that self-love may attain its object by the gratification of the benevolent passions as by the gratification of
- uiy others. There is no fundamental inconsistency between
Benevolence and Self-love : in promoting another's good I am not necessarily subtracting something from my own. To this ai'gument he adds some homely practical reflections on the fallacy of supposing that happiness consists in riches, honours, &c. things which cannot be given to another without being taken from oneself. And then in the last resort there remains the consideration that Conscience " goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own ". The postulate of immortality reconciles the rare cases of real collision between public and private good. What is there in all this to justify either the perplexity or the contempt of a critic occupying Mr. Courtney's philosophical stand- point '? It is no doubt a pity that Butler should not have
