J 132 F. H. BKADLEY'S PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC. of the theory of knowledge that has sprung from the psycho- logical doctrine of Association of Ideas. With respect to this part I can only say here that I think Mr. Bradley most successful in his criticism, and that the chapter on Association is a valu- able contribution towards a sounder psychology. The chapter on the Inductive Methods sums up from a higher point of view than has generally been taken the difficulties which most serious critics of Mill's Logic have felt in their regard. I am glad to find that Mr. Bradley takes a view which I have more than once expressed, that a false prominence has been attached to these methods as parts of the general doctrine of Inference supported by Mill. The chapter on Equational Logic is acute and ingenious. I imagine that the ground of Mr. Bradley's strongly expressed approval of a doctrine deviating so widely from his own is the conviction that the Equational Logic avoids at all events the numberless psychological abstractions of the ordinary and em- pirical logic and that it does make a vigorous effort to describe the modes in which we deal with the real in knowledge. The Third Book continues the analysis of Eeasoning and leads up to the final logical problems. I am well aware that no brief abstract can give a fair idea of the merits of the prolonged treat- ment of inference which is contained in these books, and that any attempt to compress the author's results simply casts into the shade the most interesting and instructive part of his work. The nature and forms of inference are handled with unwearied patience ; such parts of the current logic as specially concern themselves with the foundation of the process are sifted and examined with minute and sometimes exhausting care ; inci- dental problems receive brief and generally luminous discussion. A brief statement, moreover, must do injustice to the individuality of Mr. Bradley's method, which is such as, I think, will cause trouble to many of his readers. Mr. Bradley begins with a general view of inference which is later on altered in accordance with the distinctions arrived at in the course of the discussion. Eegarding inferences as a process in which a new truth is reached from something accepted, he more formally translates these popular terms into the statement that an inference is an ideal construction resulting in the perception of a new connexion. A conclusion, as such, is not something merely given ; it is reached. The accepted data are not isolated elements standing apart from the conclusion. In the process they are looked at, placed together, put in a relation to one another, ideally experi- mented on, and the result is a new relation perceived or the perception of a new relation. This general statement and the empirical examples which cohere with it lead to a very vehe- ment polemic against our ancient friend the Syllogism. Mr. Bradley's grounds of quarrel are varied. He denies that sche- mata, general forms of valid inference, can be laid down : we can indicate only the general heads of relation within which by ideal
