H. MAUDSLEY'S BODY AND WILL. 137 Of course, if it were possible to show that human volitions are capable of complete explanation and certain prediction, such a distinction would be no longer tenable. But has Dr. Maudsley shown this '? Appeal is made by him to the admitted fact that statesmen, lawgivers, men of the world, &c., can frame general maxims concerning the conduct of mankind under given circum- stances. But surely this falls short of what the case requires. Proof is needed, not merely of regularity in the average and pro- bability in the particular instance, but of universality in the general law and absolute certainty in the special case. No such proof is forthcoming It seems then that the testimony of practical human life does not make in Dr. Maudsley's favour so unequivocally as he is ready to suppose. The witness next examined is consciousness. We are warned at the outset, that we must not in this matter accept the hearsay report of metaphysicians. According to this report, con- sciousness tells us (1) that we have a will, (2) that it is free. Dr. Maudsley maintains that on both these points its evidence has been falsified. He argues that consciousness tells us nothing of a will, on the ground that it tells us nothing of "an abstract will-entity ". The entity referred to turns out to be identical with the immaterial Ego which wills. Metaphysicians try to show that such an Ego is implied in the unity of self-consciousness. This argument Dr. Maudsley first mis-states, and then demolishes. According to him the " claim put forward " is, that there must be " some bond of unity between particular volitions". Now metaphysicians generally maintain that in every single instance of conscious choice there is implied an active self which, recognising causes as reasons, weighs and compares them with each other. Dr. Maudsley proposes that we should substitute the material organism instead of this immaterial self. The metaphysician replies that the unity of consciousness is not of the same kind with the unity belonging to a complex whole made up of inter- acting paits. " But why not ? " says Dr. Maudsley, and indeed he does not seem able to catch even a glimmering of the " why not ". The reason which he puts into the mouth of his imaginary opponent is, that a unity perceived from within cannot be identical with a unity perceived from without. But this is a very inadequate statement of the case. For, though we infer that the Ego is a unity because it internally apprehends itself as such, the unity which it apprehends is not identical with the unity which we infer. The former is constituted by relations among perceptions, the latter is implied in the perception of relations. This view of the question has found much favour of late : yet it is entirely neglected by Dr. Maudsley. Again, admitting that mental and bodily unity exactly correspond, why should thepi-i.-< be assigned to the latter instead of to the former ? What if the mind be the thing-in-itself , and the brain only phenomenal of it ?
