GREEN'S ETHICS. 185 262) : the good will is " the one unconditional good . . . the end by reference to which we estimate the effects of an action" (p. 316). On the other hand, it is explained that the "good will" must not be understood to be "a will possessed by some abstract idea of goodness or moral law," which would " amount to a paralysis of the will for all effectual application to great objects of human interest ". We conclude therefore that a will is not good, as with Kant, merely through its motive being pure regard for duty, but through its leading to good effects ; and accordingly Green expressly says that a man " cannot have been good unless" he has done what is good in result " (p. 332). It immedi- ately occurs to us that, if this be true, in order to be good a" man must have more than a mere will to be good ; his zeal must be according to knowledge ; he must have the power of foreseeing what actions will lead to good results. " A dominant interest in the perfection of mankind " will avail him little, if he erroneously supposes that it may be best promoted by a free use of dynamite. And besides mere knowledge there are various other qualities, caution, presence of mind, instinctive sympathy and tact, &c., the want of which, as is commonly thought, may seriously impair the good effects of the most well-intentioned acts. How then can we say that a good will is the " one unconditional good"? Green meets this difficulty by dogmatically enun- ciating that " there is no real reason to doubt that the good^ or evil in the motive of an action is exactly measured by the good or evil in its consequences as rightly estimated " (p. 320). " With the whole spiritual history of the action before us on the one side, with the whole sum and series of its effects before us on the other, we should presumably see that just so far as a good will . . . has had more or less to do with bringing the action about, there is more or less good . . . in its effects." Nothing that can be called evidence is offered on behalf of this startling presumption, and I cannot conjecture on what grounds Green considered himself justified in thus dogmatically affirming it : especially when I find him saying later on that it is " obvious that the exact measure in which my conduct has fallen short of ... perfection," in any particular action, " cannot be speculatively ascertained, till we can see all moral effects in their causes ". If it is obvi- ously impossible to ascertain how far the effects of any action are good, how can I possibly tell that they are certain to be exactly as good as the agent's motives were? The perplexity is made greater when Green goes on to admit 13
