GIORDANO BRUNO. 255 necessity of his own nature, not by a necessity external to himself in the manner of things that are said to be sub- ject to necessity. In God, therefore, necessity is one with freedom. God always acts in the best possible manner be- cause he has perfect knowledge. If men knew all things perfectly they also would always act in the best way, and therefore all would act in the same way. But the wills of men are everywhere perturbed by passion and by the hidden causes of things {affectu atque rerum latentia). Hence they must often hesitate before choosing one of two opposite courses. For this reason the liberty of man must be classed among those things that are subject to uncertainty. It is not fitting that this kind of liberty should be ascribed to God. In one place Bruno distinguishes between divine neces- sity or fate and the necessity of nature. Knowledge - and will are declared to be identical both in God and in nature. The order that is in natural things is a kind of knowledge the knowledge that each thing has of that which is similar and of that which is dissimilar. This knowledge is identical with the will to seek the one and to escape from the other. Now in nature different effects are never the effects of the same will or knowledge. But particular effects are not always produced when the will to produce them is present, because the}' may be prevented by the action of other things. Thus " the necessity of nature " is the necessity which we ascribe to particular laws of nature ; " divine necessity " is the necessity by which the whole could not be other than it is. 1 This doctrine of necessity, and that of the coincidence of will, power and act in God, by which it is connected with the doctrine of the infinity of the universe, are not to be taught to the multitude ; for although they are not really dangerous to morals, yet they are sure to be misunderstood by the unlearned. This has been considered by those theologians who ascribe to God a free-will resembling that of man. The} 7 have seen that the multitude will never be able to reconcile merit and demerit in the choice of justice or in- justice by men with necessity in God. But philosophers in teaching the doctrine of divine necessity do not wish to deny the merit of right actions or the moral freedom of man ; and therefore " the not less learned than religious theolo- gians" have always been willing to grant freedom of philo- sophising, and true philosophers for their part have always been favourable to religions. 2 1 Summa Terminorum metaphysicorum, Gfrorer, p. 512. DdV Infinite, Wagner, ii., pp. 26-7.
