342 CHARLES MEKCIEB: example : the feeling of Terror which, I say, arises on the cognition of the accessibility of the organism to a noxious agent of overwhelming power, will not arise unless the acces- sibility is cognised, nor unless the noxiousness is cognised. But this is not all. Cognition of these relations will deter- mine the arousal of some Antagonistic feeling, but for this feeling to assume the gravity of Terror a further cognition must be added. The power of the agent must be cognised as overwhelming. The concurrence of these three cognitions is a necessary prerequisite to the feeling of Terror. To descend still further into particulars, and to take a case the most unfavourable to the doctrine here advanced : A woman goes into a paroxysm of terror at the sight of a mouse. How are the conditions satisfied in such a case ? That the cogni- tion of accessibility is a condition of the feeling is seen in the fact that if the mouse is encaged terror is not felt ; or if felt, the chance that "it may get out" is assigned as a reason. That the mouse is believed to be noxious, and that in a high degree, is sufficiently evident. Doubtless, cross- examination might not elicit any precise form of injury to be feared, that is to say, the cognition is not necessarily definite, but its vagueness is sufficiently compensated by its strength, which no amount of argument can overcome. So far the conditions are satisfied, but is the power of the mouse cognised as overwhelming ? If not, the scheme falls to the ground ; and at first sight it seems very difficult to say that it is. Of course, as far as mere mechanical strength is con- cerned the supposition cannot be entertained, the comparison is absurd. But the word "power," as used here, includes far more than this. It means capacity of doing injury, which includes the element of unavoidableness. However over- whelming may be the mere mechanical strength of the agent, yet if it is easily escaped, its capability of inflicting injury is limited ; and on the other hand, the agent may be weak to insignificance in mere mechanical strength, and yet have other sources of power which render it in the highest degree formidable. Such an agent is a venomous snake ; and when it is remembered that the terror inspired by such an agent will be greater the less the means of defence, the smaller the opportunity of escape, and the more rapid the movements of the snake, it becomes apparent that the power spoken of is not necessarily mechanical energy but power to injure, and includes as part of that power the element of unpreventableness or inescapableness. The whole of the qualities may be summed up as degree of noxiousness. Now let us return to the case of the mouse, and observe that,
