THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE. 379 all-inclusion with sensible change and objective specification. The co-existence of identical duration with temporal muta- tions, so unintelligible to philosophical thought, is demon- strably effected through organic processes. The chief aim of Conceptual Transcendentalism has ever been the cancelling of time and its phenomenal diffractions. It strives to comprehend in one simultaneous activity the entire contents of universal consciousness. In our own unity of apperception, in which we combine through thought into one single mental presence many transitory moments of perception, is seen the beginning of a process which, carried to the utmost, must culminate in identification with universal consciousness, through an adequate and simultaneous reali- sation of all eternal world-relations. But what kind of eternity is it that Transcendentalism is thus hypostatising ? Is it simply infinite duration ? Or is it complete riddance of the phenomenal illusion of time ? It is not difficult to see that only the former is consistently implied in Conceptual Transcendentalism. If universal consciousness is at all analogous to our own consciousness as conceived by Transcendentalism ; if it consists in the synthetical activity of a supreme understanding, holding together in one simultaneous presence all world-relations ; then such a synthetical activity must necessarily be continued without relaxation from moment to moment. The result of the activity may remain identical all the while, but the synthetic process has to be maintained without interruption in order to produce such an identical result. It is, therefore, a continuance of effect, an identical filling of time, but not veritable nullification of all time through timeless being, not true subsistence in eternity, that distinguishes the contents of universal consciousness from those of individual con- sciousness. From this alone there might be drawn various conclusions seriously damaging the tenets of Transcendentalism. If it were true, for instance, as some eminent philosophers assert, that only change of mental states can constitute conscious- ness, it would follow that universal consciousness must be entirely unconscious, because it is thought of as quite change- less. However, it is not very clear w T hy change of mental states should be indispensable to consciousness. If I look steadfastly at a tree, I remain conscious of the presence of the same tree, as long as my perceiving faculties keep unim- paired. AVhy should not a universal consciousness with indefatigable faculties remain for ever unchangeably conscious of the totality of all world-relations ? But, in this case, if
