j. SULLT'S OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 433 that the term indicates then no new unique process, but simply concentration of attention on that which is given in memory. It certainly becomes possible for the individual to reflect defi- nitely on his own mental existence as contrasted with the stream of events taken to be objective, and we can trace the steps by which the power is gained ; but there needs no new term to indi- cate the fact. The few indications given by Mr. Sully of the main conception on which he proceeds do not allow him, I think, to attain any very clear discrimination of the province of psychology from other branches of philosophy. In fact, were one to press to their con- clusion the expressions regarding inner experience and psychology- as a science, they would warrant one in saying that psychology had no relation at all to philosophy, and that it stood on its own basis as a treatment, in scientific fashion, of a body of specially characterised facts. Such a conclusion would be unfortunate, though one should deprecate the inclusion in psychology of certain problems not uncommonly dragged in, and should maintain that a distinction can be indicated sufficient at once to give a clear ground for psychological analysis and to connect it with general philosophy. It appears to me that if we proceed towards a determination of the exact nature of psychological material and start, as we must do, with broad currently accepted distinctions, we arrive inevitably at the conception of the individual conscious subject as that which gives unity to all the phenomena of the so-called inner life. We cannot express a fact of mind otherwise than through terms which imply the peculiar reference to the indi- vidual subject and the distinction between the state of the individual and that which is, as we should put it, the content of the fact. Our analysis of the conditions under which the sense of individual mental existence comes about may force upon us the conclusion, that in the complex mechanism through which it is realised there are the possibilities of affections which we could hardly describe in similarly precise terms, but we interpret these only through the analog}* of the mental existence in which the in- dividual is aware of himself and has opposed to Him a relatively objective system. By objective, I may note, there is not implied extra-organic ; the dualism which starts with mind and things seems to me not only wholly misleading but wholly needless for psycho- logical analysis. A thing, in the sense of an extra-organic object, is an extremely complex determination of the individual's thought, and we can trace genetically how the characteristic features come to be added on to the perfectly general opposition of individual consciously existing and that which is object for him. When we work backwards and endeavour to indicate the full nature of this ultimate fact, we are brought, I think, to see that the current separation of Knowing, Feeling and Acting does in- justice to the unity of mind. Briefly, one would say there can be
