w. G. MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. 447 . that the only standpoint from which the universe can be viewed organically is that of an existing intelligence. ANDREW SETH. the Philosophy of Laic, Je&'yned mainly o-s an Infrodvctioa to the *tn.'l>i of International Lair. By WILLIAM GALBRAITH MILLER, M.A., LL.B., Lecturer on Pubhc Law (including Jurisprudence and International Law) in the University of Glasgow. London : Griffin, 1884. Pp. xv., 432. The law of nations is deemed, by a standing literary and academical tradition, to have some peculiar and intimate con- nexion with the law of nature, which in modern usage has come to mean the philosophy of law in general. Yet the most suc- cessful writers on international law have not been those who most professed to be philosophers. Nor does philosophy much abound among the sort of men who are most active in making precedents for this branch of jurisprudence. But a body of doctrine which may be definitely said to owe its existence to an ethical and philosophical movement, and which is still more or less vague in principle, and, as compared with municipal law, both uncertain and scanty in details, offers irresistible temptations, as it may assert a historical claim, to greater freedom of speculative treat- ment than lawyers permit themselves in things clearly proper to their art. Mr. Miller was quite in accordance with Continental and Scottish custom in putting forth a scheme of Na.i>rrr>?cht " as an introduction to the study of International Law on a scientific basis " ; although this involves the discussion of many things that do not appear at first sight to have much bearing on the laws and usages of war, neutrality, territorial sovereignty, and the like, or indeed any bearing at all. Indirectly, Mr. Miller's work is a protest against the English school of jurisprudence as conceived by him. He says, " At the time I commenced to lecture, it seemed to be a tenet of the orthodox English school of jurisprudence that International Law was not law, and the most satisfactory mode of answering such a contention was to examine the nature of law in general ". 1 am not quite sure what the orthodox English school of juris- prudence is, or where it is to be found. Eecent serious writers in England on the philosophy of law may still be counted on one's fingers. I doubt whether more than half of them, if so many, would accept Austin's dogmas about the distinction be- tween Law and Morality, or in particular the dogma that Inter- national Law is a kind of Positive Morality. In any case, it is open to doubt whether our Universities and the Inns of Court can be said, as yet, to have established a school of jurisprudence at all, though it is to be hoped we are on the way to it. Eor my part, I so far agree with Mr. Miller as not to accept the supposed
