462 w. WUNDT'S LOGIK, n. The second chapter is devoted to the consideration of the Logic of the Historical Sciences, and commences with a discussion as to the general position and objects of Philology and History. To this succeed Philological Herrneneutics and Criticism ; the func- tion of the former, as I understand it, being to explain the nature and conditions of any phenomenon or event in the moral world, for the present reference is of course to this only, a process analogous to many which have to be performed in the material world : whilst Criticism is essentially confined to the process of clearing away the intermediate confusions or errors which have arisen in the process of getting at the phenomenon. We can undertake to interpret nature itself, but we can only undertake to criticise some human view or account of it, so that the appli- cations of the two closely allied sciences are considerably different. The principles regulating the interpretation and authentication of MSS. come in for discussion at this point. In respect of the attempted Science of History, in the sense at least in which it was contemplated by Cornte and Buckle, Prof. Wuiidt has some forcible objections to make. The attempt of Buckle to deduce, by the merely Comparative Method, laws of historic sequence, he entirely scouts, considering that " rain follows sunshine " would be of as much scientific value as his well-known generalisations about the relatively decreasing im- portance of the intellectual motive factor in human life. He regards History as far too vast and varied, as well as (what is an even more important point) too unique in character at every .stage, to yield itself to this comparative method : one might as well attempt, by mere comparison of remote geological epochs in the history of our planet, to deduce the laws of physical causation. The final chapter in this part is devoted to the consideration of the Social Sciences. These are related to the Historical Sciences in that they consider the simultaneous rather than the successive states of Society ; but they can, for their due explana- tion, no more dispense with the latter than could, for example, in the physical province, Physiology dispense with the evolu- tionary element. They constitute in fact what Mr. Spencer terms the Statics as contrasted with the Dynamics of the sub- ject (the particular analogy here suggested is however rejected as misleading). Amidst the mass of loose generalisations and confusion of departments which have gained currency under the name of Social Science, two departments at any rate may be singled out as depending upon distinct and well-justified scientific resources. The first of these is Ethnology, a science which though dealing with both the physical and moral sides of man belongs essentially to the latter, in that the physical characteristics derive all their interest and importance from their bearing on the moral. The second is at present in little more than its commence- ment. (The terms used for them are respectively Elhnoloyie or VolkerJcunde, as opposed to Demoloyie or Bevolkerungskunde.)
