554 W. L. DAVIDSON : virtue as a habit, and partly from the circumstance that Virtue must be clearly discriminated from Duty. Eegarded as an act, the essence of virtue is self-sacrifice, self-abnegation, self -sur- render. But self-sacrifice has no meaning except on the supposi- tion of contending or opposing forces : it is essentially a conflict and a victory. And, as the conflicting forces in human nature are, in the last analysis, two in number selfishness and unsel- fishness, Virtue is heroic successful resistance of solicitations to selfishness ; a heroism, moreover, which costs us effort, which has merit attaching to it, which we admire and praise, but which we cannot exact as a matter of strict obligation. Antagonism and effort, on the other hand, disappear when virtue is considered as a formed habit ; for it is now the product of repetition, and repetition begets facility and ease and creates in us a disposi- tion towards the particular class of actions : nevertheless, merit, praise and admiration still remain. In like manner, Virtue is not synonymous with Duty. If duty is " what is due," it is that which we may lawfully claim and enforce (qfficium as opposed to benefitium) , and the correlative of " duties " is " rights ". Neither antagonism, therefore, nor merit is an essential characteristic here ; for, while we punish or blame a man for neglect of duty, we do not praise or reward him for the discharge of it. To Virtue alone are praise and reward, admiration and esteem confined : there alone does the conjunction properly obtain, e" T aperf KUI el' T eiraivos " if there be any virtue, if there be any praise ". Now, if clearness as to the notion is a first requisite for profitable discussion, confusion as to the notion is the first observable peculiarity in English ethical disquisitions. Thus Butler, in his Dissertation, nowhere lets us know what exactly he understands by Virtue, although Virtue is the subject of which he is specially treating. The nearest approach to pre- cision is when he sets it down as "justice, veracity, and regard to common good ". This is a definition by enumeration of particulars ; but neither are the particulars exhausted, nor is the essence of the thing defined herein declared. Other things besides justice, veracity and benevolence are species of Virtue ; and not all just, honest or benevolent conduct is vir- tuous. Thus, benevolence, if it is simply the natural outflow of an easy, amiable and humane temperament, has nothing of vir- tuous attaching to it ; neither are we praised for speaking the truth when there is no temptation to mendacity, or for doing justly when injustice is beyond our reach. Taken generally, " mere absence of crime where no possibility of crime could be found does not constitute virtue ; and without temptation mere innocence has no merit ". True, indeed, each and all of Butler's particulars may tinder certain circumstances rise to the height of Virtue, and so may others not included in the summary (such as mercy and humility) ; but it is just this peculiarity of the cir- cumstances that gives us the defining characteristic, and the
