558 W. L. DAVIDSON : end? " But a moment's reflection will suffice to show that the two are by no means identical ; and that the ultimate end need not be, and is not, something of which we are uniformly con- scious, in other words, something that a man aims at, and of set purpose pursues, in every moment of his existence. On the contrary, a man is nothing apart from his character; and, as character is itself in great measure a congeries of habits as it is a product, a formation, something that is built up through time and energy, the range of conscious purpose, even in morals, must be limited, and the real actuating principle may in many cases remain unperceived. Moreover, we know from our own experi- ence that the immediate springs of action are manifold and various, and that they stimulate to manifold and various ends. While at one time we are moved by a regard to virtue, we are at other times determined in our conduct by considerations of happiness or pleasure. So that it is not the circumstance of being a uniformly-present conscious motive that characterises the ultimate end : and this consideration must be kept in view if we would determine the character and nature of the summum bonum. In like manner, Psychology and Logic both afford us abundant illustrations ; but examples need not be accumulated. (2) The second class of questions is not less important. Take first the Concept or Notion. It falls to the province of Logic to consider the formation of the notion, in so far as it is con- cerned with generalisation, and in so far as it bears upon the two important processes of Definition and Classification the latter including, or reposing on, Division. But when you go beyond this, and raise the controversy of Eealism versus Conceptualism and Nominalism, you have trespassed on Psychology and Meta- physics. It is not otherwise when we turn to Judgment. This subject has well-marked aspects so many of them logical, so many metaphysical, and so many psychological: but it is the tendency at present to mix them all up together, and to relegate the discussion of them to Logic. Particularly observable is the tendency to raise metaphysical issues as, for instance, what the ultimate subject in a proposition is whether a reality or simply an idea; and, if the former, whether the reality of presenta- tion or merely the reality as something given in this, yet in itself unattained and unattainable. This innovation we pro- bably owe to the influence of Hegel, and it can be accepted only if we be prepared like Hegel to identify Logic with Meta- physics. With equal reason might we raise in Logic the discussion as to the Origin of Knowledge, for this question undoubtedly implicates the logical doctrine of Judgment, and, apart from the distinction of analytic and synthetic propositions, could not be argued. But the metaphysics of the subject is one thing, and the logic of it another ; and it does not conduce to intelligibility to have them both confounded.
