592 A. FOUILLEE'S SYSTEMES DE MORALE CONTEMPORAINS. from its ethical necessity ; while Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will originates in a criticism of the Kantian categories. The ethical theories which M. Fouillee regards as of chief importance are the Kantian and the theory of Evolution. His treatment of the latter is, however, somewhat scanty. He accepts the facts it has to offer ; but urges that, with conscious beings who can form an idea of the end of their activity, this idea is itself a tendency to its own realisation : " the idea of morality is morality begun". M. Fouillee speaks of this as his doctrine of " idea-forces " ; and, though perhaps not very original, it seems to me both true and important as correcting the ten- dency to treat the process of development in a purely external way. M. Fouillee himself holds that morality is founded partly on positive knowledge, partly and here he is, so far as I am aware, quite original on doubt. Positive knowledge would seem to be the basis of morality so far as the latter points to self-interest. The limitation of this self-interest must come from doubt. " Almost all the systems of morals we have passed in review," says M. Fouillee (p. 389), " whether belonging to the Kantian or to the Evolutionist side, still admit a certain transcendental dogmatism." This is scarcely correct, however, and the state- ment is soon modified by the author. No Evolutionist writer so far as he has shown admits " transcendental dogmatism " in morals ; and Mr. Spencer is taken sharply to task for not includ- ing among the " data " of ethics the Unknowable which plays so striking a part in First Principles. As an argumentum ad hominein, this is perhaps fair enough ; but the charge cannot be laid to the account of other Evolutionists who are guiltless of any such traces of " transcendental dogmatism " either in metaphysics or in ethics. M. Fouillee himself does not admit this transcendental element. He holds that knowledge is, as a matter of experience, limited : but limited by experience itself. And this limitation is for him the foundation of morality. " Since," he says, " we do not know the essence of all things, nor consequently of good itself, it is unreasonable to act as if we had penetrated it, as if we were certain, for example, that pleasure, interest, power, were things in themselves, the fundamental and essential reality, the last w r ord and secret of existence. The limitation of sense-egoism thus follows logically from the limitation of sense-knowledge " (p. 391)' It is difficult to see how it can have escaped so acute a critic of other theories as M. Fouillee is, that a consideration of this kind could, at most, only paralyse activity, not moralise it. Doubt as to the absolute reality of one's own pleasure would equally extend to the pleasure of others. In particular, there would be no sufficient reason for the individual to limit his own action so as not to interfere with the liberty of others, unless by having recourse either to the " transcendental dogmatism " that the rights of all are equal, or to grounds of general utility. W. E. SOKLEY.
