72 S. H. HODGSON ON THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD, ETC. Secondly, the name Metaphysic is applied, and has always been applied, to that inquiry which examines the nature of existence in the largest sense of the words, TO bv f/ bv, ical ra TOVTW virap-^ovra tcaO' avro. Our present method ex- amines this object-matter in the only way in which it can be examined, that is, subjectively, without any implication or assumption of absolute existence. Metaphysic therefore describes it better than Ontology, which by suggesting an opposition of Being to Knowing implies the assumption of Absolute existence. The kind of philosophy which I advocate is built upon experience, and upon experience alone, without the admixture of any a priori element, which I take to be a new step in the history of philosophy. But this does not weaken its title to be called metaphysic, since that name neither implies nor suggests the notion of a priori assumption. Thirdly, by calling this method metaphysical, and that analytic branch of philosophy, which is constituted and demarcated by its application, Metaphysic, I mark the claim which I make on their behalf to be the most comprehensive and the same time the most thorough of all branches of intellectual pursuit or modes of knowledge. Metaphysic and metaphysical have always carried with them the implication of this ultimate character. They mark a kind of critical inquiry from which there is no appeal to any other intellec- tual tribunal. They mark the highest limit of human intelli- gence, where it is overshadowed and judged by the Divine. To call an inquiry like this by such a name as Theory of Knowledge a name which assumes the distinction between Knowing and Being to have been already drawn, would imply that the possibility of an Ontology beyond, on a basis of its own, was a question merely postponed for the present, and that the true method of philosophy as a whole had not been found. Whereas the name Metaphysic expresses a distinct claim to have discovered this true method, thereby reducing Ontology to rank as the Constructive Branch of a philosophy which consists essentially of subjective analysis, and embodies its results. Lastly, I may say, that I chose the name Metaphysic in the first instance, because, appearing to me as it did the exactly appropriate one, it was treated, south of the Tweed at least, as a term of reproach and ridicule, following therein the for- tunes of philosophy. It had become an object of unjust and ignorant contempt ; and therefore to adopt it seemed to me a right and necessary challenge to superficial reasoners, though avoiding it would probably have secured a more favourable hearing.
