a standing monument to the excesses of frenzy: and that these were no mere figment of the poet's imagination nor a transfiguration of rites long obsolete, is proved by a single sentence of a sober enough writer of later times, 'The things that take place at nocturnal celebrations, however licentious they may be, although known to the company at large, are to some extent condoned by them owing to the drunkenness[1].'
There were of course certain sects, such as the Orphic, who, in strong contrast with the ordinary religion, upheld definite ethical standards, preaching the necessity of purification from sin, and advocating moral and even ascetic rules of life. Yet, in spite of this, we find a certain amalgamation of Orphic and Bacchic mysteries. And why? Simply because both sects alike had a single end in view, a spiritual exaltation in which the soul might transcend the things of ordinary life, and see and commune with its gods. What did it matter if the means to that end differed? The one sect might reduce the passions of the body by rigid abstinence; the other might deaden them with a surfeit of their desire; but, whether by prostration or by surexcitation, the same religious end was sought and gained, and that end justified means which we count immoral.
In effect the morality of a man's life counted for nothing as compared with his religion. Participation in the mysteries ensured blessings here and hereafter which an evil life would not forfeit nor a good life, without initiation, earn. 'Thrice blessed they of men, who look upon these rites ere they go to Hades' home: for them alone is there true life there, and for the others nought but evil[2].' It was this that made Diogenes scoffingly ask, 'What, shall the thief Pataecion have a better lot than Epaminondas after death, because he has been initiated[3]?' Seemingly religion and morality were to the Greek mind divorced, or rather had never been wedded. Religion was concerned only with the intercourse of man and god: the moral character of the man himself and his relations with his fellows were outside the religious sphere.
Indeed it would have been hard for the ancients to regard morality as a religious obligation, when immorality was freely
