Page:Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson.pdf/7

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Ark.]
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson
Cite as 334 Ark. 561 (1998)
567


tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he [or she] causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b. Comment c(3) indicates that gratuities of cash or services are collateral sources that are not subtracted from a plaintiff's recovery. The comment gives the example of a doctor who does not charge for medical services.

Other authority indicates that a substantial number of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of nursing care or services rendered gratuitously for the plaintiff's benefit. See J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Damages for Personal Injury or Death as Including Value of Care and Nursing Gratuitously Rendered, 90 A.L.R.2D 1323 (1963). The primary issue remaining today is how to value the services, see David W. Knotts, Annotation, Valuing Damages in Personal Injury Actions Awards for Gratuitously Rendered Nursing and Medical Care, 49 A.L.R.5TH 685 (1997), but that issue is determined in this case by the total medical bill submitted to Ms. Anderson by UAMS.

Montgomery Ward cites cases from Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois for the proposition that gratuitous medical services may not be an item of recovery because the policy behind the collateral-source rule does not apply where the plaintiff has incurred no expense or obligation for the services needed. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chev. Co., 392 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1979); Coyne v. Campbell, 183 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1962); Daniels v. Celeste, 21 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1939). We are, however, persuaded by cases holding that gratuitous medical services do fall under the collateral-source rule. Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin, 668 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App. 14 Dist. 1984); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Jacobs, 323 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See also Joshmer v. Fred Weber Contractors, Inc., 294 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. App. 1956), which held that contributions received by the injured party as a direct result of being injured are not to be taken into consideration in assessing damages.

[9] We choose to adopt the rule that gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source not to be considered in assessing the damages due a personal-injury plaintiff. It is