Opinion of the Court
“retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.” Id., at 816.
The significant point for present purposes is that the Court in Arizona State Legislature recognized that whatever authority was responsible for redistricting, that entity remained subject to constraints set forth in the State Constitution. The Court embraced the core principle espoused in Hildebrant and Smiley “that redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto.” 576 U. S., at 808; see also id., at 840–841 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (recognizing that Hildebrant and Smiley support the imposition of “some constraints on the legislature”). The Court dismissed the argument that the Elections Clause divests state constitutions of the power to enforce checks against the exercise of legislative power: “Nothing in [the Elections] Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.” 576 U. S., at 817–818 (majority opinion).
The reasoning we unanimously embraced in Smiley commands our continued respect: A state legislature may not “create congressional districts independently of” requirements imposed “by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws.” 285 U. S., at 373.
B
The legislative defendants and the dissent both contend that, because the Federal Constitution gives state legislatures the power to regulate congressional elections, only that Constitution can restrain the exercise of that power. Brief for Petitioners 22; post, at 17 (opinion of Thomas, J.). The legislative defendants cite for support Federalist No. 78, which explains that the wielding of legislative
