Opinion of the Court
sought to be imposed by the people of a State.” Ibid.
But the legislature in Leser performed a ratifying function rather than engaging in traditional lawmaking. The provisions at issue in today’s case—like the provisions examined in Hildebrant and Smiley—concern a state legislature’s exercise of lawmaking power. And as we held in Smiley, when state legislatures act pursuant to their Elections Clause authority, they engage in lawmaking subject to the typical constraints on the exercise of such power. 285 U. S., at 367. We have already distinguished Leser on those grounds. Smiley, 285 U. S., at 365–366. In addition, Leser cited for support our decision in Hawke v. Smith, which sharply separated ratification “from legislative action” under the Elections Clause. 253 U. S., at 228. Lawmaking under the Elections Clause, Hawke explained, “is entirely different from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution.” Id., at 231.
Hawke and Smiley delineated the various roles that the Constitution assigns to state legislatures. Legislatures act as “Consent[ing]” bodies when the Nation purchases land, Art. I, §8, cl. 17; as “Ratif[ying]” bodies when they agree to proposed Constitutional amendments, Art. V; and—prior to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment—as “electoral” bodies when they choose United States Senators, Smiley, 285 U. S., at 365; see also Art. I, §3, cl. 1; Amdt. 17 (providing for the direct election of Senators).
By fulfilling their constitutional duty to craft the rules governing federal elections, state legislatures do not consent, ratify, or elect—they make laws. Elections are complex affairs, demanding rules that dictate everything from the date on which voters will go to the polls to the dimensions and font of individual ballots. Legislatures must “provide a complete code for congressional elections,” including regulations “relati[ng] to notices, registration, supervision
