Page:Moore v. Harper.pdf/43

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Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
5

Thomas, J., dissenting

rymandering claims present a political question that is nonjusticiable under the North Carolina Constitution.” Id., at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 400–401. It concluded:

“This Court’s opinion in Harper I is overruled. We affirm the three-judge panel’s [original] 11 January 2022 Judgment concluding, inter alia, that claims of partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable, political questions and dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. This Court’s opinion in Harper II is withdrawn and superseded by this opinion. The three-judge panel’s 23 February 2022 order addressing the Remedial Plans is vacated. Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed with prejudice.” Id., at ___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 449.

In short, this case is over, and petitioners won. The trial court’s original final judgment in favor of petitioners, affirmed by the State Supreme Court in Harper III, represents “the final determination of the rights of the parties” in this case. N. C. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(a) (2023). Harper I has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims for relief have been dismissed on adequate and independent state-law grounds. As a result, petitioners’ alternative Elections Clause defense to those claims no longer requires decision; the merits of that defense simply have no bearing on the judgment between the parties in this action. That is the definition of mootness for an issue.

It follows that no live controversy remains before this Court. For any case or controversy to exist here, petitioners must be injured by the judgment below, and we must be able to redress that injury by acting upon that judgment. See, e.g., Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4); see also Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 86 (1807) (“The criterion [of] appellate … jurisdiction, is that it revises and corrects the decisions of another tribunal”). But petitioners are not injured by the judgment of Harper I at all, nor could we redress any