Page:Moraltheology.djvu/62

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BOOK III

ON LAW

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF LAW

I. A LAW in general is a rule of conduct, but the term needs to be defined more exactly in order to mark it off from precepts and counsels.

A law, then, in the strict sense of the word, is, according to St Thomas, an ordinance of the practical reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has care of a society. [1]

It is said to be an ordinance of the practical reason, for a law orders human actions with a view to a certain end, but to order and select proper means toward an end belongs to the reason; and since the ordering in question has reference to practice and is imposed by authority, it is attributed to the practical reason. Law, then, begets an obligation in the subject, and in this differs from a counsel.

For the common good indicates the end of all good laws.

By him who has care suggests the source of law which can only be one who has authority over the whole community. Regulations made by subordinate authorities are called in English by-laws, in ecclesiastical language, statutes.

Of the society.—These words imply that the subject of law is not a single person or a family; a law is made for a community more or less numerous.

Promulgated.—Promulgation is the publication of the law by legitimate authority with a view to imposing an obligation. Some sort of promulgation is required in order that subjects may know of the existence of the law and the time when it begins to bind. In English legislation the time when a law will begin to take effect is often set down in the law itself; otherwise it begins to oblige when it receives the royal assent, by which act it is also promulgated.

There used to be a controversy as to what sort of promulgation is necessary in order that ecclesiastical laws may be

  1. St Thomas, 1-2, q. 90, a. 4.

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