In taking up this position the German Government undoubtedly intensified the difficulties its representatives were afterwards to be confronted with and which led to such dire results. An active and overbearing interference succeeded years of complete apathy and indifference, and was entrusted to civilians and military men who were utterly inexperienced in the handling of problems of native administration which were, indeed, wholly new to Germany. The upshot was inevitable. To assume political responsibility for African territory without exercising authority over the acts of local settlers, and providing machinery for the redress of native grievances is always a grave error. In this particular case it was particularly disastrous owing to the unsettled conditions prevailing within the territory.
The German settlers had two chief obstacles to contend with. One was the state of endemic warfare between the Hereros and the Hottentots—the latter of whom, although much fewer in numbers, were better armed and better shots. The struggle between these two races had continued ever since the southern Bantu movement came into contact with the drive northwards of the Hottentots, impelled thereto by white pressure from the South. Between 1864 and 1870 it went on uninterruptedly. It was renewed from time to time between 1870 and 1890, when it broke out again with renewed violence. The other obstacle lay in the fierce competition between the German newcomers and British and Boer colonial traders from the Cape. Probably these men were neither better nor worse than their German competitors; but they admittedly, and with the support of prominent Cape politicians, did everything possible to oppose the Germans both in matters of trade and in matters political. There was a strong party at the Cape which wanted Damaraland and Great Namaqualand annexed to Cape Colony, and which bitterly resented the action of the Home Government in not preventing the establishment of German political control over those regions. The natural conse-
