affirmed the international character of the Morocco problem in the Act of Algeciras in 1906.
Now, there is no doubt—as Mr. L. S. Woolf remarks—that the principle insisted upon by Germany in the events which led up to the Conference of Algeciras was that the regulation of the question of Morocco belonged not to any one Power, but to the Powers collectively. The danger of the Morocco question for the peace of Europe was that Foreign Governments would act as isolated Sovereign Powers towards Morocco. The essence of the French case was that France could, and would, so act; the essence of the German case was that the Powers should act collectively. That was why Germany, in 1905, was demanding, and France resisting, an International Conference.
With these secret arrangements for the dismemberment of Morocco in their pockets, the British and French Governments went to the Algeciras Conference and affixed their signatures to the Act, there drawn up "in the name of Almighty God," and "based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his Dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality." They departed from the Conference and began immediately to give effect to their secret compact. The second German intervention was the result.
Throughout the whole of this nefarious transaction the peoples of Britain and France were absolutely deceived as to the cause of German action. It is essential to remember this. For seven years—until the secret arrangements were revealed in 1911—the British people were led to believe that in resisting French encroachments upon Morocco, Germany was trying to upset the Anglo-French Entente. For seven years the French people were led to believe that in supporting their Government against German intervention in Morocco affairs, they were opposing an unwarrantable assault upon their dignity. Neither people had the least idea until the mischief was done and had become irreparable, that their Governments had all along been acting in virtue of a secret and internationally illegal pact; that the German case was intrinsically just, and that Germany had been treated as though her signature at the foot of international treaties could be regarded as a negligible quantity. To do the French justice they tardily recognised the fact:
