APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2
Aware of Novotny's vulnerability, Slovak officials led by Alexander Dubcek criticized in the Central Committee the party boss and his ineffective, Czech-dominated administration. Other party leaders, including Czechs who sought a change in leadership, soon joined in these personal attacks on the previously sacrosanct Novotny. He was replaced as First Secretary by Dubcek in January 1968.
Dubcek and his colleagues won popular approval after they announced a comprehensive reform program—the so-called Action Program published in April 1968. Dubcek's proposed "democratization" called for ending the Communist Party's tight control of society. The program guaranteed personal rights and liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to travel, work, and—in some cases—reside abroad permanently. Lifting the party's heavy hand from the process of government, the program directed the National Assembly to assume its rightful role as the "supreme organ to state power." In sum, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was given the task of "humanizing" socialism by making it responsive to basic democratic processes.
From the beginning, however, the new leaders in Prague and their "political experiment" were confronted with significant opposition, both foreign and domestic. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries saw in the reform program the seeds of a disintegration of the Czechoslovak Communist system which could have dire effects on the political, economic, and even military integrity of the bloc. At the same time, conservative Czechoslovak Communists were concerned over both the ideological "deviation" of Dubcek's programs and their own political positions should he succeed. As foreign pressures on Dubcek to modify his program mounted, most of the competing interest groups within Czechoslovak society closed ranks to force a strong bond of anti-Soviet nationalism between the liberal party leaders and the ordinary people.
Domestic solidarity, however, could not deter the fateful Soviet invasion. On the night of 20-21 August 1968, approximately 300,000 troops, predominantly from the Soviet Union but including forces from East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary, occupied Prague and the other major urban areas. There was no organized military resistance, and casualties were extremely light, despite sporadic gunfire and attempts by some Czechoslovak citizens to sabotage the movements of the invading troops. Key Czechoslovak leaders, including Dubcek, were taken to Moscow, where they were held captive during "negotiations" between 23 and 26 August.
During and immediately following the invasion, Czechoslovak national unity and loyalty to the Dubcek leadership reached unparalleled heights. The Soviets had mistakenly assumed that they could install a collaborationist regime within hours after the intervention, but these plans had to be changed when the Soviets realized that an abrupt ouster of the Dubcek leadership could result in an uprising similar to that in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek and the other top officials returned to Prague, and the Czechoslovak leadership remained intact.
Nevertheless, the Soviets launched a campaign to deprive Dubcek of support within Czechoslovakia. Their primary tactic was to undermine the Dubcek leadership by forcing it to comply with Soviet demands. Meanwhile, a "shadow" leadership dominated by "realists," including Slovak Party boss Gustav Husak, gradually emerged. The newly ascendant group called for accommodation with Moscow as the only possible course, while attempting to curry popular favor by implementing those remnants of Dubcek's reform program that did not conflict with Soviet objectives. As the leading spokesman for "realism" and "normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union, Husak won the party's nomination as Dubcek's successor and in April 1969 was named First Secretary (now called General Secretary).
When Husak assumed power, he faced a faltering economy and a thoroughly disordered society. Although most Czechoslovaks looked with distaste on what they viewed as Husak's opportunistic willingness to do Moscow's bidding, they reluctantly agreed that he was the least odious of the available alternatives. Although Husak managed to inject a degree of restraint into the "normalization" process, as time went on the bulk of Dubcek's reforms were dismantled; censorship was reinstitute, the party's control over all segments of the government and society was restored, freedom of travel to the West was sharply curtailed, and the various special interest groups that had sprung up under Dubcek were either disbanded or reoriented to serve the purposes of the party. Moreover, the party was subjected to a massive purge. Of the 1.7 million party members when Husak came in, some 300,000 were stricken from the rolls and another 200,000 resigned in disgust. In the end, the individuals who were in the forefront of the Dubcek reform movements were removed from positions of power and ostracized. Dubcek, for example, was assigned to run a motor pool for the Slovak Forestry Administration.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110010-2
