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ideological purity (a fairly hopeless task in any case) and more with the airing of grievances in open debate. Lest the organizations shy away from this new responsibility, as frequently has been the case, the party has undertaken private opinion polls to uncover popular discontents. At the local government level, district councils have been granted a measure of autonomy over budgetary and developmental planning. At the national level, electoral reforms have even allowed candidates "not hostile to the socialist system" to run against party-approved men. In 1971 at least five "spontaneous" candidates won parliamentary seats—an encouraging number, though hardly enough to boost the regime's avowed hopes of upgrading the national legislature qualitatively.
Through the use of these pluralistic techniques the HSWP has become a somewhat more benign and less pervasive influence. While loosening its hold, however, it has shown no inclination to abandon the single-party ideal or its dominance in practice. A new constitution, in preparation since 1969, presumably could lead to further liberalization, but the delay in its issuance may indicate that the party for now would prefer to mark time. Should Kadar go many more steps forward politically, he always risks striking that great vein of nationalistic sentiment that lies so near the surface. And the consequent unleashing of anti-Soviet and irredentist emotions could easily result in an era of Warsaw Pact-enforced repression.
The Economy, the NEM, and the Consumer (C)
Hungary, by exercise of its national pride, has overcome poverty but has failed to become a rich nation. As a result of Turkish conquest and Habsburg oppression, Hungary remained backward long after other European countries had been fully developed. Well into the 20th century, for example, remnants of semifeudal practice still persisted in its predominantly agricultural society. Ravaged by the retreating Germans toward the end of World War II and then despoiled by Soviet occupiers (a point carefully omitted from Communist histories), Hungary in 1945 lay prostrate—its industry in ashes, its farms untended, its population decimated and starving, and its currency virtually worthless. At this dire pass, the country fell into the hands of Marxian Socialist planners and their Moscow mentors. Their philosophy seemed to be that blood could be extracted from a stone.
Hungary, as with the other "people's democracies," was obligated by the Soviet Union at the start to push industrialization to the limit, without regard to its resources. Particularly trying was the effort to build from scratch—at a terrible cost to the laborer and consumer—a base of heavy industry. Lacking the necessary experience, Hungarians committed egregious planning, management, and production mistakes. In the process, the nation became a veritable sweatshop. Workers initially bore the burden, but then lapsed into apathy on finding little reward in terms of the ordinary comforts of life. At times during this era Hungary was hard put to compete even with its eastern neighbors. In sum, it received a heavy dose of Stalinist-style industrial socialism, and nearly choked in the process.
Virtually the same methods were applied to agriculture, with virtually the same results. Enforced
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