APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
the Hungarians as opposed to one-fourth for the Protestants) had become a spiritual and secular power long prior to this century. Unwilling to sacrifice this privileged position, it faced an inevitable clash with the new creed of communism. Attacking hard and fast from the beginning, the regime nationalized the church-run school system, expropriated church lands, abolished religious orders, jailed recalcitrant clergy, and took overall charge through a State Office for Church Affairs. Faced with a merciless foe, the church slowly and stubbornly gave way. For its part, the regime came to realize that it could not win total victory, and from the early 1960's it began to abate its harassments and strike bargains with the church. Today, a modus vivendi obtains, uncomfortable though it may be. The church abstains politically. The state allows the church a modest subsidy. Ostensibly there is a reconciliation, chiefly in favor of the state. Yet, state authorities remain wary of an institution that continues to have such a powerful emotional hold on the people—one that they themselves cannot hope to emulate.
Kadar, it would appear, has neutralized and pacified those individuals and institutions hostile to his cause. Presumably he has little to fear. Yet, the trauma of the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet uprising of 1956 lives on in the minds of those now in control. Never ones to take matters of state security on faith, they remain constantly watchful of their enemies, whether they be rightist emigres in Vienna or former Rakosists in Budapest itself. The government has even drafted plans to deal with a future uprising—the possibility of which seems slim to all except those ruling Communists who might be its victims.
Lest government opponents, latent or real, become overly optimistic about their chances, government authorities continue to exercise internal control through an information and security network. The print and broadcast media, both regime-controlled, largely echo the party line (though far more subtly than in the past) and serve as channels of instruction to the populace. Censorship has been relaxed and independent views are at times permitted to circulate, particularly in the periodicals of the cognoscenti. In like manner, parades, mass rallies, party indoctrination sessions, and poster campaigns have been deemphasized in order to avoid propaganda overkill with resulting suspension of belief. Nevertheless, the regime's message remains strong and clearcut. It glorifies the Soviet Union, the socialist system, the party, and the national economic goals. There is no doubt as to who is in the saddle in Budapest.
As with almost any government, the Kadar group seeks to stop trouble before it starts. Police informants and opinion polls are devices used to listen in on public sentiment. Mass organizations, as noted earlier, are encouraged to voice complaints and help defuse touchy situations. In the event that sterner measures are called for, the government comes well-armed, chiefly in the person of the internal security police—originally the AVO and now referred to as the AVH. In early days the AVO was essentially an elite intraparty group, largely Moscow-directed, that enjoyed virtually absolute authority over the nation's vital organs. Its tactics were crude but effective: swift arrest, forced confession, summary verdict, and lengthy imprisonment—or, perhaps more humanely, immediate execution. In short, the Hungarian authorities who closed out a 16th century peasant rebellion by frying its leader on a metal throne and forcing his followers to eat the flesh had little on the sadists of the AVO. Since 1962 the regime has curbed the powers of the AVH and purged it of its worst elements, but some of its reputation for cruelty lives on. Regular legal procedures are not observed. But the statutes against antistate activity are broadly worded, and the regime is not averse to tightening the screws if need be.
Should a national emergency occur, the armed forces would come into play. In view of lingering doubts about their loyalty and effectiveness, this prospect is a fairly cheerless one for the government. In terms of manpower, the regular armed forces are the smallest in the bloc, numbering only about 97,500. And, in terms of gross national product, Hungary spends less on defense (4% in 1971) than any other East European nation. Economic and social needs take priority, but, more important, the crisis of confidence in the military establishment resulting from its failure to respond during the 1956 revolt has not been completely overcome. Since then it has been rebuilt, politically purified, and reindoctrinated with the message of loyalty to the state. The armed forces returned to participation in Warsaw Pact exercises in 1966 and in small numbers joined the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Neither action, however, has been taken as a final judgment on their capability or reliability.
15
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
