APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
Kadar, the Soviets, and the Future (C)
On taking office in 1956, the Kadar regime faced the herculean task of restoring a nation torn asunder by revolt. It proceeded slowly and a bit uncertainly to build a Hungary that would first conform to the requirements of the U.S.S.R.'s security and dogma and then be capable of meeting popular needs. Progress at time was almost imperceptible, but finally there has emerged a new political entity—one that can claim to be the most stable and liberal in Eastern Europe.
At present, the Hungarian people are largely docile—a tribute of sorts to Kadar and his group. The NEM has offered the promise of a better material life. Intellectual horizons have been broadened a bit by a tolerance for for greater freedom of expression. Increased visiting privileges to the West have alleviated the sense of physical confinement. Overall, tentative understanding between the party and the people has been established. Still, Kadar and his cohorts remain wary lest a misstep topple the delicate structure they have so carefully raised. In particular they are concerned, as ever, about a recrudescence of Magyar nationalism that might well trigger a Soviet move destructive of what has been accomplished thus far.
To a large extent the prospects for Hungary are intertwined with the personal fate of Kadar. Sixty years old as of 1972, he may on account of health have few years left. His rule has been highly personalized and a degree intuitive. No heir apparent exists, nor is there the promise of one who can match Kadar's example. In the event of Kadar's weakening or demise, proregime and antiregime forces may well be prepared to battle for control of his legacy to the Hungarian people.
Even now, footdragging on some of Kadar's policies is more the rule than the exception. Support for the NEM in particular has shallow roots and may have been shaken further by late-hour economic reverses. And the success of NEM depends ultimately on political reform, which still must find its way around the doctrine of party supremacy. Then, too, it is evident that not all of Kadar's problems lie within his domestic line of sight. Hungary's "separate road to socialism" arouses deep fears among neo-Stalinist elements elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The Soviets themselves, while praising Hungarian reforms in general terms, have also warned Kadar to go slow on several occasions. Kadar probably is in no immediate danger, but in dealings with Moscow he has little room for miscalculation.
Whatever the fate of Kadar and his program, Hungary over the longer term seems destined to remain a pawn of big-power politics. As a small nation, it can do little to improve its role in Europe or on the international stage. At best it must pray that the currents of change will permit a wider opening to Western influence and a consequent weakening of Soviet domination. Given these trends, a Hungarian government would have a freer hand for the development of the nation on the basis of its own rather than alien requirements.
Such an outcome is not considered a likely prospect by most Hungarians, however. On the basis of experience they are reasonably certain that the Soviets are not about to relax their grip on Eastern Europe. And so, the Hungarians must continue to accept foreign domination as they have so often in the past, uncomfortably and unwillingly, yet with a fortitude that seems to guarantee their continuance as a nation.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110037-3
