Page:NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs.djvu/7

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Ackermann J

application should be opposed and that important matters were raised.”[1]

[7]Davis J also correctly pointed out that this Court has made it clear[2] that any evidence that the State considers relevant to an issue of the constitutional invalidity of a statutory provision ought to be adduced before the High Court first hearing the matter.[3] The learned Judge held that such consideration, however important, did not in itself justify the granting of a postponement which had to be based on clear principle. Davis J pointed out that no reasons at all had been furnished for the respondents’ failure to observe the rules of court, that they had treated their obligations to the court with disdain and had ignored the rights of the applicants to a resolution of their claims and that accordingly the application had been dismissed.[4]

[8]The respondents sought in this Court to revisit the refusal of this application in two ways. First, they applied on notice of motion for an order with, amongst others, the following terms:

“1. Condoning the [respondents’] failure to file their Answering Affidavit in the

  1. Above n 1 at 287 C–E.
  2. In Parbhoo and Others v Getz NO and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1337 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1095 (CC) at para 5, which was decided seven months before the application in the present matter was launched.
  3. See above n 1 at 286 J – 287 B.
  4. See above n 1 at 287 E – 288 A.
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