Page:NCGLE v Minister of Justice.djvu/113

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Sachs J

Just as “liberty must be viewed not merely ‘negatively or selfishly as a mere absence of restraint, but positively and socially as an adjustment of restraints to the end of freedom of opportunity’ ”,[1] so must privacy be regarded as suggesting at least some responsibility on the state to promote conditions in which personal self-realisation can take place.


  1. Brennan “Reason, Passion, and the Progress of the Law” The Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, (1988) 10:3 Cardozo Law Review 1 at 10, quoting Cardozo The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) at 118.
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