Opinion of the Court
“may be regulated by the States” even “in the absence of all congressional legislation.” Id., at 320.
Eventually, the Court cashed out these warnings, holding that state laws offend the Commerce Clause when they seek to “build up … domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and business of other States,” regardless of whether Congress has spoken. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443 (1880). At the same time, though, the Court reiterated that, absent discrimination, “a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to” the interests of its citizens. Ibid.
Today, this antidiscrimination principle lies at the “very core” of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 581 (1997). In its “modern” cases, this Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement of state laws “driven by … ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’ ” Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 337–338 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273–274 (1988)); see also Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 9) (observing that this Court’s cases operate principally to “safeguard against state protectionism”); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 373, n. 18 (1994) (describing “a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause” as “discrimination against interstate commerce”).
Admittedly, some “Members of the Court have authored vigorous and thoughtful critiques of this interpretation” of the Commerce Clause. Tennessee Wine, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (citing cases). They have not necessarily quarreled with the antidiscrimination principle. But they have suggested that it may be more appropriately housed
