Page:NPPC v. Ross.pdf/33

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
27

Opinion of the Court

Roberts, C. J.). These include social costs that are “difficult to quantify” such as (in this case) costs to the “national pig population,” “animal husbandry” traditions, and (again) “industry practice.” Post, at 6–9; see also post, at 3–5 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). But not even petitioners read Pike so boldly. While petitioners argue that Proposition 12 does not benefit pigs (as California has asserted), they have not asked this Court (or any court) to treat putative harms to out-of-state animal welfare or other noneconomic interests as freestanding harms cognizable under the dormant Commerce Clause. Nor could they have proceeded otherwise. Our decisions have authorized claims alleging “burdens on commerce.” Davis, 553 U. S., at 353. They do not provide judges “a roving license” to reassess the wisdom of state legislation in light of any conceivable out-of-state interest, economic or otherwise. United Haulers, 550 U. S., at 343.[1]

V

Before the Constitution’s passage, Rhode Island imposed special taxes on imported “New-England Rum”; Connecticut levied duties on goods “brought into th[e] State, by Land


  1. Both dissents seek to characterize today’s decision as “fractured” in an effort to advance their own overbroad readings of Pike and layer their own gloss on opinions they do not join. Post, at 1, 8 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); see also post at 2–4, 8–10 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). But the dissents are just that—dissents. Their glosses do not speak for the Court. Today, the Court unanimously disavows petitioners’ “almost per se” rule against laws with extraterritorial effects. See Parts II and III, supra. When it comes to Pike, a majority agrees that heartland Pike cases seek to smoke out purposeful discrimination in state laws (as illuminated by those laws’ practical effects) or seek to protect the instrumentalities of interstate transportation. See Part IV–A, supra. A majority also rejects any effort to expand Pike’s domain to cover cases like this one, some of us for reasons found in Part IV–B, others of us for reasons discussed in Part IV–C. Today’s decision depends equally on the analysis found in both of these sections; without either, there is no explaining the Court’s judgment affirming the decision below. A majority also subscribes to what follows in Part V.