The PCP was in 4-ply paper bags and each bag was individually wrapped with a "stretch wrap," which is a thin film of plastic wrapped continuously around the bags upward to the top and back down. Sixty 50-pound bags of PCP were stacked on each of the 12 36-inch by 42-inch wooden nonreturn pallets to obtain maximum use of the containers. Each bag had an EPA label that indicated it was a pesticide and provided the following information: product, trade name, technical name, instructions for use and hazard warnings.
The Testbank's "Dangerous Cargo Manifest" lists IMCO defined dangerous cargo on board and provides the port of loading of each container storage location on the vessel. The cargo manifest incorrectly lists PCP as a liquid; it should be listed as a solid.
Other Information
Pilotage in the MRGO
Pilotage was compulsory for the foreign vessels involved in the accident, and two pilot's associations serve the area. Pilotage is provided by the Associated Branch Pilots from the sea at the MRGO entrance to light 73, about 33 miles above the entrance, where they are relieved by the Crescent River Port Association Pilots who navigate the vessel to New Orleans.
Analysis
Operation of Testbank
The pilot boarded the Testbank with full knowledge expected traffic to be encountered outbound. He participated in the required pre-sailing conference with the master and ascertained that the foreign master spoke English fluently. The Testbank was navigated outbound without incident until the reach of the MRGO passing Shell Beach.
The Testbank pilot's actions of slowing the vessel and changing courses to the right while closely watching the Seadaniel were those of a prudent seaman. The Testbank was being navigated in a narrow shallow channel having a width of about the length of a vessel. About 2030 in the vicinity of the left turn to enter the reach at lights 103/104, the pilot of the Testbank reduced his vessel's speed to half ahead, about 9 to 10 mph, due to the fishermen's vessels in the area. Although he initially progressed down the channel centerline, he started moving the Testbank slowly off to the right-hand side of the channel when at least three or more miles distance from the approaching vessel. The speed was further reduced and the course was altered further to the right when the vessels were about 2 miles apart. About 2042, the Testbank's pilot was aware of a slight course divergence to the right by the Seadaniel and was closely watching the vessel's aspect as the Seadaniel came to its left to recover. By moving his vessel slightly to the right, the pilot of the Testbank had hoped to remove some of the psychological pressure on the Seadaniel's pilot during the passing. He observed a "gentle" steady swing of the Seadaniel to its left that appeared to be under control and capable of providing a safe passage. At 2043, about the same time he heard the Seadaniel's broadcast regarding an errant hard to port rudder, the pilot of the Testbank observed an increase in the rate of swing of the Seadaniel. Within a few seconds, he ordered the danger signal sounded and ordered the engine stopped and put astern. Taking into consideration the closeness of the right descending bank and also the approaching vessel, the pilot of the Testbank ordered the rudder hard to starboard, but this order could not have prevented the collision. Considering the amount of time and space available, there was little, if anything, the crew of the Testbank could have done to avoid the accident.
