Page:NTSB-RHR-76-2.pdf/22

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PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Tran5portation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the truckdriver to stop his vehicle short of the track until it was safe to proceed. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate sight clearance between the road and the track on the approach to the unprotected grade crossing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board submitted the following recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration:

"Include procedures in the FHWA guidebook and training course for highway/railroad engineers, concerning the design and safety of grade crossings, which will insnre that proposed active grade crossing protection devices are operational when upgraded or newly constructed streets or highways are opened. (H-76-21)

"Urge and assist all States which have high—speed passenger train corridors to (1) initiate without delay a comprehensive field review of the corridors and (2) establish and implement a schedule of projects to insure that each grade crossing receives appropriate safety treatment." (H—76-22)

The National Transportation Safety Board also submitted the following recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration:

"Require improvements to the coupler assembly on the French-manufactured turbotrains currently in service to minimize the possibility of uncoupling under crash conditions." (R—76—23)