Page:NTSB RAR-72-5.pdf/20

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central dispatcher of trouble and for notifying the responsible agency‘s personnel of an emer- gency.

At about 12:27 p.m. on June 1-0, 1971, information was received and relayed over the town's communications system that a catas- trophic accident had occurred on the ICRR near the boundaries of Salem. Almost instantly, emergency personnel, and vehicles were dispatched to the scene and the surrounding communities were alerted and requested to provide assistance. The hospital staff was alerted and they prepared to care for the injured. Doctors, including a dentist and a veterinarian, proceeded to the scene to provide first aid and to dispatch the most seriously injured promptly to the-hospital.

A portable field hospital unit in Salem was made available and moved to the high school which was opened as an emergency station. Many of the less seriously injured passengers were treated at the high school, while some of; the more Seriously injured were first treated there and then moved to hospitals in the surrounding area. When the Salem hospital. became filled, the injuredy were moved promptly to other hospitals. Many of the uninjured passengers were brought to the high school and were cared for until arrangement's could be made for them to continue their journey.

The State Polite were notified immediately of the accident and two troopers were dispatched to the scene. It was through their direction and effort that most of the passengers were evacuated from the cars. Windows-were broken. out of the upper sides of the coaches and ladders were placed down into the cars. This permitted rescue workers to enter the cars and provided exits. Passengers too severely injured to help themselves were secured plywood stretchers and pulled out by ropes. Rescue wokers found that the end doors of the cars were blocked and either could not be used or were very' difficult to open. One of the few problems that soon developed was a shortage of ladders.

Within about 2 hours after the accident, all the injured had been removed from the scene and were: being treated, the fatalities had been removed, and: the remaining passengers were receiving care.

H. Examination of Locomotive Unit 4031

1. At the Scene of the Accident

The rear truck: of unit 4031 remained attached to the unit when it was turned over on its side. Both of the leading wheels of this truck had flat, spots about 10-¾ inches in length These flat spots had produced a false flange on the outside edge of the tread. (See Figure 7.) The fact that there were no other flat spots on the wheels indicated that the wheels had not turned after locking. When the gearcase cover was removed, no broken gear teeth or other defects in the gears were found which would have caused the wheels to lock.

The relays and the circuits of the wheel-slip device for the rear truck had been burned to such an extent that the condition of the relays before the accident could not be determined. The light bulb of the wheel-slip warning device was found to be serviceable. The throttle was in the idle position; the automatic brake valve was in the emergency position; and all other controls were in their proper position for the operation of the locomotive.

2. Inspection of the Track

Due to the finding of the locked pair of locomotive wheels, the southward main track was inspected northward from the point of the accident to Effingham. Marks were found on the rails, on joint bars, and on heel blacks and frogs of turnouts which indicated that the wheels had slid over these appurtenances. The first such mark was found on a heel block of a switch at Mason, Illinois, 27.3 miles north of the point of the accident. The mark, 20 inches in length, had been caused by contact of the flange of the wheel with the heel block. The surface of the

heel block was 1-9/16 inches below the top of

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