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of welded rail would eliminate all but a few of the rail joints, reducing the possibility of such penetration. A heavy compressor was driven through the roof of the dining car, and a crosstie was thrust through a broken window. The potential lethality of these objects is obvious but, in this accident, only the crosstie struck a passenger which resulted in a fatal head injury.

The bending of the roofs downwards caused the metal ceiling to separate, producing sharp edges in three of the overturned cars.[1] (See Figure 13.) The deformation of the super- structure of the cars not only caused injuries but made rescue of the passengers extremely dif- ficult. The passageways at the ends of the cars were either blocked or difficult to use, and with no emergency exits, the passengers had to wait until the rescue personnel could break windows on the top sides and provide ladders for climbing out. (See Figure 14.)

The basic structure of a passenger car provides excellent protection for passengers during ac— cidents of the magnitude obtained in this derail- ment. Some features in the design of the car interior, in addition to the windows, however, could be changed to eliminate their injury- causing cap-abilities during accidents. If windows could be designed to prevent a passenger’s being ejected and if the injury causing features could be corrected, the railroad passenger fatality rate could be reduced to almost zero.

Preliminary reports from railroads using clear, unbreakable, plastic panes in side windows of passenger cars indicate that if windows of this material can be better secured in the car, the window may be able to withstand the forces in accidents and thus prevent pelsons from being ejected from cars. The use of smaller windows and guards to prevent the ejection of passengers would be another alternative. The use of this type of window, however, requires other emer- gency exits.

Propane tanks, beneath the car floors, were torn loose from their mountings and scattered throughout the wreckage (See Figure 15 ) Rescue personnel smelled propane when they first arrived on the scene, and all persons in the vicinity were warned about smoking and the use of open fires around the coaches. The escaping gas was not ignited, but if fire had started in the overturned coaches, the results could have been disastrous, because the passengers only escape was through windows overhead. Whereas the propane was used to operate the air conditioning systems on some of the cars in this train, the air conditioning systems on most passenger cars of other trains are operated either by electricity or steam.

Emergency took, first-aid equipment, and fire extinguishers found on many other passenger trains, although not required by Federal Regula- tions, were not available on many of the cars in this train. Because of pilferage, it was the policy of the ICRR not to maintain emergency tools on passenger cars. In the railroad accident which occurred at Glenn Dale, Maryland, the Safety Board found emergency tools camouflaged and recommended that either the container for the tools or the tools be painted a contrasting color to the car's wall.[2]

J. The Evacuation of the Injured and Care of the Passengers by People of Salem

The response by the local people was the most prompt and the post accident activities were the best that has been found by the Safety Board in any railroad accident it has inves— tigated. The success of this endeavor was the result of previous planning and practice by the officials and people of Salem. If other towns in the United States would recognize this need and would make in-depth plans for emergencies, many disasters could be minimized.


  1. The Safety Board has found this problem to must on intercity buses: and school buses involved in accidents and has made recommendations for correction.
  2. NTSB's Report of Derailment of Penn Central Train 153 at Glenn Dale, Maryland on June 28, 1969, NTSB-RAR-70-1

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