Page:NTSB RAR-73-5.pdf/20

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The engineer of train 416 had not worked as engineer of 416 before the day of the accident. He had been, however, an engineer since 1960 and had worked in suburban service for about 4 years. The conductor and the collector had worked on 416 for about 2 years and had previously held similar positions on train 720.

The medical histories of the crewmembers contained nothing to indicate that their physical or mental abilities may have been a factor in the accident.

Postaccident Tests and Inspections

Visibility and stopping distance. After the accident, tests were made (1) to determine the stopping distances of trains with consists similar to those of trains 416 and 720 and (2) to determine the visibility between trains in the vicinity of the accident. The three Highliner cars which were on train 416 on the day of the accident and one other Highliner (to replace the destroyed car) represented 416. Three pairs of older cars, each pair consisting of a motor car and a trailer car, represented 720. These "old" cars were ballasted to compensate for the weight of the passengers carried by the train at the time of the collision. Weather conditions during the tests were similar to those at the time of the accident.

Some of the tests, and their results, were as follows:

  • A full Service brake application was made on 416 at a point opposite the center of the 27th Street platform, while the train was moving at 63 m.p.h. The train stopped with the front end 1,713 feet north of the point of brake application.
  • With train 720 standing at Signal 3-3.60, the engineer could not see 416 when it was more than 50 feet north of the 27th Street platform.
  • With train 416 standing just north of Signal 3-3.10 and train 720 moving north, the engineer of 720 first could see 416 when 720 was 1,819 feet south of Signal 3-3.10; he could first see Signal 3-3.10 when 720 was 1,723 feet south of the signal.
  • With train 720 standing 500 feet south of the collision point, the engineer could continually see train 416 as 416 moved northward from the point of impact for a considerable distance north of Signal 3-3.10.