Page:NTSB RAR-73-5.pdf/62

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APPENDIX H

The result was that the strongest part of the older car, its frame, struck relatively weaker parts of the newer car, above its frame. The Board believes that a collision between two highliner cars in good condition would have resulted in less intrusion into the passenger compartments of the cars. As long as the older cars continue in service, there is a possibility of similar results should a collision occur at the same speeds.

Other safety benefits also may be realized through the replacement of the older cars with new highliner cars. The differences between the braking characteristics of the two types of equipment, described at the public hearing, would be eliminated. In addition, because the new cars would be equipped with two—way radios and speedometers, operating safety would be improved.

The Board has already made interim recommendations to the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad concerning the visibility of the rear ends of trains and marker lights which could, with study by UMTA be converted into specifications for the 15 additional highliner cars. The Board is also aware of agreements between the Illinois Commerce Commission and the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad to make radio and intercom available to trainmen on the rear ends of trains, to make conductor's brake valve available on rear ends of trains, and to make brake valves accessible to conductors while they are at the control panel in the vestibule. These matters could also be converted into specifications for the 15 additional highliner cars.

The Board has also made recommendations to the Federal Railroad Administration concerning design adequacy of a certain weld used to attach the collision posts to the underframe in highliner cars. It was recommended that FRA determine whether the current design of the attachment of collision posts used on other highliner cars comply with the regulations and that enforcement action be taken to assure that the requirements are met.

In making these recommendations, the Board pointed out that it had not determined whether the current Federal regulations, even if met, would have provided strength sufficient to resist this particular crash. Study of the crash has made it clear that the existing requirements based on the Locomotive Inspection Act do not address many of the factors in crash-resistant design of railroad passenger-carrying equipment. The Board believes that UMTA is capable of improving, through changes to newer cars, some other weaknesses of crash resistance which were not controlled by the existing Federal regulations. The recommended specification areas are meant to provide improvements within the same general design.

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