Page:NTSB RAR-73-5.pdf/7

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II. FACTS

The Accident

At 7:06 a.m., on October 30, 1972, Illinois Central Gulf (ICG) commuter train 416 departed from the South Chicago station, on time, and headed north toward downtown Chicago. The train consisted of four new bi-level Highliner cars and was manned by an engineer, a collector, and a conductor. Earlier that morning, the traincrew reported to work at the 83d Street yard, where they inspected the train and tested the airbrakes. Before the train was taken to South Chicago for the start of its revenue run, the conductor instructed the engineer to make all stops enroute to downtown Chicago, including the flag stop at 27th Street.

The train's brakes seemed to operate perfectly at each of the 12 station stops between South Chicago and 53d Street. At the 53d Street station, train 416 waited for ICG commuter train 718 in order to transfer passengers, but left at 7:31 On track 3, when 718 did not arrive on time. Some passengers were standing in the first and last cars of 416 after the 53d Street stop.

As the train passed 31st Street, the conductor, standing in the center vestibule of the third car, announced the stop at 27th Street over the intercom. The train approached the 27th Street station in daylight under an overcast sky. The engineer testified that when he applied the brakes, 416 was traveling at 62 m.p.h. The train, however, passed the station platform at a speed estimated by several witnesses as between 20 and 50 m.p.h. When the train finally stopped, the rear car was about 600 feet north of the platform and about 400 feet north of Signal 3-3.10. (See Figure 1.)

The conductor proceeded to the center vestibule of the rear car, opened one of the doors on the platform (west) side of the train, and plugged his microphone into the train's intercom system. The engineer buzzed the conductor for permission to back up, and the conductor told him over the intercom to do so.

While the train backed toward the platform at a speed of between 5 and 15 m.p.h., the conductor remained in the center vestibule, maintained contact with the engineer, and leaned out the open door. The engineer simultaneously leaned out the east side of the train and looked back until he was forced to pull his head in by the approach of train 718 on the adjacent track. The collector was proceeding toward the engineer's operating compartment.