Page:NTSB RAR-77-10.pdf/20

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vague. The motorman's understanding that the lack of an audible alarm negated the requirement of bulletin S-511-76 for him to contact the central controller for permission to move was not correct. When an overspeed situation existed, the alarm was actuated; however, it would not operate if the train was braking. Therefore, he would not have gotten an alarm as he was stopping at Randolph Street. He further attempted to justify his moving on a flashing red cab signal aspect, without obtaining permission from the controller, by reference to the training brochure. Bulletin S-511-76 did not specifically mention how it affected part 2 of the training brochure, but even so the motorman should have obeyed the bulletin which in application and practice supercedes existing instructions on the subject matter to which it is addressed.

The motorman of the train following the Lake-Dan Ryan train apparently moved his train into a red signal block in violation of bulletin S-511-76. He would have had to move his train into the block occupied by the Lake-Dan Ryan train on a flashing red cab signal and there is no record of his first receiving permission from the controller. This action may have been prompted by the emergency situation so that passengers could detrain at the platform rather than on the elevated track structure.

The Lake-Dan Ryan motorman, having operated a train over the West-South Line for an appreciable time, should have known the correct cab signal aspects he would obtain for the varied track occupancy conditions. Further, since he testified that he knew the meaning of bulletin S-511-76, he should have known its application. It is possible that he may have been influenced by operating requirements over other lines on which he operated. The scope of the CTA training program may be adequate as an initial indoctrination, but because of the seniority system by which the motormen operate, the younger men may operate infrequently as motormen and there is a risk that their knowledge of the meaning and application of the rules and procedures will become obscure. The present method of reinstructing and retraining employees covers only those rules or procedures that are violated. The program does not include a comprehensive review of all of the operating rules and procedures, nor is there a program which periodically schedules complete reviews. [1]

The CTA's system of randomly monitoring the performance of motormen and conductors does not insure that those individuals being monitored can be assessed accurately on their knowledge and understanding of the rules. It is quite likely that during the time an employee is being observed, a situation may not arise that would require him to exercise his understanding of a rule. Reinstructing an employee on a rule that has been violated is a necessary practice, but it is an after-the-fact corrective action. A greater effort must be expended toward educating the employee to understand the rules and to apply them correctly in various situations. Based on the


  1. This analysis reflects the policy at the time of the accident. CTA has initiated post~accident changes.