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operator's failure to comply with that train order practice which requires the application of a blocking device to the pertinent signal lever and the display of the train order signal before copying a train order. Since the dispatcher also failed to require the display of the train order signal before transmitting the train order, it suggests that the questionable practices may be widespread on this division.
Conrail's program which was submitted to FRA failed to accomplish its intent - to assure the understanding of the rules and compliance with them. FRA's monitoring of Conrail to determine if it were following its program was also ineffective. The Safety Board questions the adequacy of Federal oversight in this case to insure the Conrail program of operating tests and inspections that allows an employee, such as the OW operator, to be hired, trained on the job, and work for over a year without any supervisory review of his performance.
The Safety Board is concerned for the safety of train operations on the Metropolitan Region of Conrail because of the large volume of passenger traffic. The apparent failure of Conrail management to recogniz the danger of failing to take corrective action to bring train operations in compliance with their operating rules and timetable special instructions must be corrected. Therefore, the Safety Board urges the FRA to immediately launch a safety review of the operation of trains on the Metropolitan Region of Conrail to bring those operations in compliance with the operating rules and timetable instructions as issued by Conrail.
CONCLUSIONS
FINDINGS
1. The operator at OW interlocking operated the signal lever which permitted train No. 74 to obtain a clear signal because he failed to remember that an opposing train order was issued to OPSE-7 and that he had not applied a blocking device to the signal lever.
2. The operator at OW interlocking did not display a train order signal. Therefore, train No. 74 proceeded on a clear signal. The operator could not 'display a train order signal because the wiring to the signal had been disconnected, and because the windows were nailed shut, the alternate method of hanging a yellow light or flag on the tower could not be used.
3. Conrail condoned the unauthorized train order practice of not displaying a train order signal which violated their own operating rules.
4. The engineer of train No. 74 was not aware that OPSE-7 was westbound on track No. 2 because he was monitoring radio channel 3, as directed, while OPSE—7 was receiving train orders on channel 2, as directed.
5. Conrail freight trains cannot monitor radio communications to passenger trains from Grand Central Terminal to Harmon because Conrail freight locomotive units are not equipped with radios that have Metro Region Commuter radio channel 3, the established channel for operations in the area of the accident. Failing to provide freight locomotives with a radio for channel 3 is a poor operating practice and a violation of Conrail rules and Federal regulations.
