Page:NTSB RAR-81-4.pdf/9

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Track damage was confined to the area of the collision and the 112 feet No. 74 was pushed rearward. The third rail equipment [1] was also damaged when the second car of train No. 74 derailed and came to rest against it.

Damage was estimated as follows:

Equipment $900,000
Track 10,000
Wreckage and cleanup 5,000
Total $915,000

Crewmember Information

The crew of Conrail OPSE-7 consisted of an engineer, a conductor, and two trainmen. All were qualified under Conrail operating rules without restrictions. They had reported for work at Oak Point Yard, Bronx, New York, at 10:30 a.m., and had been on duty about 6 hours. (See appendix B.)

The crew of Amtrak train No. 74 consisted of an engineer, a fireman, a conductor, and two trainmen. All were Conrail employees and were qualified under Conrail operating rules without restrictions. The engineer and fireman had reported for work at Harmon at 2:55 p.m., and had been on duty approximately 1 hour 30 minutes. The conductor and two trainmen had reported for work at Albany, New York, about 1:05 p.m., and had been on duty about 3 hours 15 minutes. (See appendix B.)

The train dispatcher was qualified under Conrail operating rules without restrictions. He had been on duty about 1 hour 30 minutes. He had worked for Conrail for 4 years 6 months and had been a dispatcher for 1 year 6 months. Before becoming a dispatcher, he had worked as an operator. During his employment as an operator, he attended a 2—week school for operators in Wilmington, Delaware. He had 2 months on-the-job dispatcher training, which included operating rules classes, train order classes, and observing dispatchers responsible for three separate districts. After the accident, he stated that he had not required the operator to respond "Stop signal and train order signal displayed" as required by Conrail rules for issuing ‘a "J" order because, "it was never a practice in our office because the facilities for displaying a train order signal does not exist in most towers." He further stated that when he was an operator he had received train orders but did not displays train order signal because the facilities did not exist.

The OW Operator was qualified under Conrail operating rules without restrictions. He had been on duty about 1 hour 15 minutes. After the accident, the OW Operator stated he did not apply the blocking device. He further stated, "that is something you do automatically. You say 'BDA' and then go over and do it. This was the way I was trained." He had been working for Conrail for 1 year and 22 days. He had received on— the—job training with various operators on duty for 57 days and had worked on all three shifts. Before‘beginning the On-the-job training, he had attended 4 days of classroom instruction on the Conrail Rules of the Transportation Department. Before completing

the on—the-job training, he succesfully passed a written examination on the Rules of the


  1. A sliding contact shoe attached to the car truck of the electric equipment which collects current from the rail located alongside the running rail.