Page:NTSB Rar-94-01.pdf/16

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Between 3 02 and 3 05 a m, the Mobile Police Department's 911 operator contacted the Mobile Fire Department and the Coast Guard. Police, fire, and Coast Guard personnel began notifying other emergency responders; more than 60 local departments eventually responded Train 2's OBS supervisor, using a cellular telephone, called the Mobile 911 operator about 3:05 a m and provided additional information about the accident location and what was taking place at the site The OBS supervisor did not know the exact location of the derailment, however For about 18 minutes—from 3 02 to 3 20 a m —confusion ensued as the Mobile, Saraland, and Chickasaw 911 operators tried to locate the accident site. Exactly where train 2 had derailed was unclear, and no roads lead into the area, which is heavily wooded swampland. Before they knew they would have to respond by water or rail, the emergency responders searched by land for the accident site.

Also about 3 05 a m, the captain of the MAUVILLA, concerned about his situation with the barges, broadcast a distress message on VHF/FM channel 16 "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, the motor vessel MAUVILLA [garbled], got a tow broke up right below anchorage end of pier and seems to have a cable or something wrapped in the wheel, barges adrift southbound. . If anybody down there can help rounding them up, I would appreciate it" [1] The U S Coast Guard Group Mobile (Group) received the radio transmission, the radio operator on watch responded and asked for a position.[2] The MAUVILLA's captain replied "We're between the upper end of Twelve Mile Island [mile 9 6] and the old maritime cut [Mobile Tensas Cutoff, mile 12.1, Mobile River], somewhere in that area and I'm not exactly sure on the mileboard over"

Responding to the Group radio operator's questions about 3 06 a m, the captain said that four people were on board, that the MAUVILLA was unable to move, and that the vessel was in no danger of sinking He added, "I believe we are right on top of this thing" About 3 07 a In, the Group told the captain that a train had derailed. The captain replied, "I believe we're right below the train. They's a helluva fire up here in the middle of the river and there ain't supposed to be no fire up here and, like I say, I don't know exactly where we at. It's so foggy I can't tell. .by looking on the radar, so there's something bad wrong up here."

The Group's radio operator asked the captain about 3 11 a m whether he was involved in the train derailment He replied' "I can't tell you for a hundred percent whether I'm involved in it or not We are right below it, I'm not sure what's going on I come up here it was so foggy I can't tell where I'm at I can't get away from the barges where I'm at. I'm gonna try to get out of here and see if I can't go up there and help somebody "

When the captain arrived in the wheelhouse shortly after he felt the "bump" and assumed control of the tow from the pilot, the starboard quarter of the towboat was up against the bank,

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  1. The vertical clearance of the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge, about 7 feet, was not sufficient to allow the barges to pass under it The starboard lead barge, for example, had a freeboard (height of the hull above the waterline) of about 5 feet 10 inches, and its cargo hopper extended an additional 2 feet, for a combined total height of about 7 feet 10 inches
  2. The Coast Guard Group Mobile continually records radio transmissions. Times were taken from a transcript of the Group's tape recordings.